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Casenotes and Comments 
THE FDA, CONGRESS, AND MOBILE HEALTH APPS: LESSONS 
FROM DSHEA AND THE REGULATION OF DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS 
NATALIE R. BILBROUGH* 
Within the past few years, the mobile health applications (“apps”)1 
industry has exploded, with the number of available apps surpassing 
100,000.2  One study shows that by 2018, more than half of the 3.4 billion 
smartphone and tablet users will have downloaded a mobile health app.3  
The sheer scope of mHealth,4 and particularly mobile health apps, presents 
exciting possibilities for public health, but also formidable obstacles for the 
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 1. A mobile app is “a software application that can be executed (run) on a mobile 
platform . . . or a web-based software application that is tailored to a mobile platform but is 
executed on a server.”  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION STAFF, MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS 7 (2015), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM263366.pdf [hereinafter MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE].  For purposes of this 
Comment, a “mobile health app” refers generally to any mobile apps that have a health, wellness, 
or medical function, and should not be confused with “mobile medical apps,” a term used by the 
FDA to designate a narrower class of mobile health apps.  Id. at 4.  For a description of the history 
of mobile apps, see Alex Krouse, Note, iPads, iPhones, Androids, and Smartphones: FDA 
Regulation of Mobile Phone Applications as Medical Devices, 9 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 731, 733–
35 (2012).  
 2.  RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, MHEALTH APP DEVELOPER ECONOMICS 2014: THE STATE OF 
THE ART OF MHEALTH APP PUBLISHING 7 (2014), available at 
http://research2guidance.com/r2g/mHealth-App-Developer-Economics-2014.pdf.  
 3.  Health Information Technologies: Administration Perspectives on Innovation and 
Regulation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 13–14 (2013) (statement of Christy L. Foreman, Director, 
FDA Office of Device Evaluation), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Testimony/ucm344395.htm [hereinafter Statement of Christy L. 
Foreman]. 
 4.  mHealth is “the delivery of healthcare services via mobile communication devices.”  
Carol E. Torgan, The mHealth Summit: Local & Global Converge, KINETICS (Nov. 6, 2009), 
http://www.caroltorgan.com/mhealth-summit/. 
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federal agencies charged with protecting consumers.5  Given that many 
mobile health apps are not developed with professional medical input, the 
risks of malfunction or erroneous health advice are great.6  For these 
reasons and others, physicians and other health care providers have 
generally been reluctant to incorporate mobile health apps and other types 
of mHealth into their practices.7 
Recognizing the need for some measure of oversight, the Food and 
Drug Administration (“FDA”) released a guidance document in September 
2013 proposing a risk-based approach in which the FDA would actively 
regulate only a smaller subset of mobile health apps.8  According to the 
guidance document, the FDA will regulate only “mobile medical apps” 
(“MMAs”), which are mobile apps that meet “the definition of a device 
under section 201(h) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act” 
(“FDCA”).9  However, some stakeholders, scholars, and members of 
Congress consider FDA interference in this area to be unwarranted or ill-
                                                          
 5.  See, e.g., Nathan G. Cortez et al., FDA Regulation of Mobile Health Technologies, 4 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 371, 372–75 (2014), available at http://www.law.smu.edu/getmedia/c5412c9e-
b58b-4461-a725-f900ddf56127/Nathan-Cortez—NEJM-article-072414 (discussing ways to 
realize the promise of mobile health technologies but also analyzing the challenges of applying the 
FDA’s current medical device regulatory framework to mobile health technology); Nicolas P. 
Terry, Information Technology’s Failure to Disrupt Health Care, 13 NEV. L.J. 722, 724 (2013) 
(arguing that mobile health apps are “the first major success story of health care disruption by IT 
because they can disorder the high friction, embedded cost of location-specific medicine with a 
new model of ‘health care everywhere’”); SARAH FELLAY, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE, 
CHANGING THE RULES OF HEALTH CARE: MOBILE HEALTH AND CHALLENGES FOR REGULATION 
7–9 (2014), available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/-fellaychanging-the-
rules-of-health-care_100901289367.pdf (critiquing the inadequacies of the FDA’s approval 
process as applied to health software). 
 6.  Pamela Lewis Dolan, What’s Missing from Many Health Apps—Medical Expertise, 
AMEDNEWS.COM (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.amednews.com/article/20130513/business/130519995/6/ (citing a study conducted at 
Ohio State University which found that a third of the pain-related apps evaluated had no input 
from a healthcare professional).  App providers such as Apple and Google may ban certain apps, 
but they do not certify the accuracy or health safety of mobile health apps.  Samuel J. Dayton, 
Note, Rethinking Health App Regulation: The Case for Centralized FDA Voluntary Certification 
of Unregulated Non-Device Mobile Health Apps, 11 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 713, 715–16 (2014). 
 7.  See Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22.  Seventy-three percent of doctors do not suggest 
mobile health apps to patients and 13% discourage them.  Id.  One doctor claimed, “I would never 
see a patient and make a decision based solely on the records on their phone . . . maybe in 10 
years.”  Carl Franzen, Side Effects May Vary: The Growing Problem of Unregulated Medical 
Apps, THE VERGE 7 (June 3, 2013), http://www.theverge.com/2013/6/3/4380244/how-should-
medical-apps-be-regulated. 
 8.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1, 4.  This document was updated in 
February 2015 to be consistent with changes made to the regulation of medical device data 
systems, but most of the document is identical to the 2013 version.  Compare id., with Mobile 
Medical Applications; Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug Administration Staff; 
Availability, 78 Fed. Reg. 59038 (proposed Sept. 25, 2013). 
 9.  Id. at 4.   
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fitting.10  In 2013 and 2014, several members of Congress proposed bills to 
amend the FDCA,11 the source of the FDA’s authority to regulate medical 
devices, by excluding certain types of software used in MMAs from the 
FDA’s jurisdiction.12 
The FDA faced a similar situation in the early 1990s with the dietary 
supplement industry.13  After an outbreak of supplement-related deaths, the 
FDA suggested stricter regulation of dietary supplements.14  In response, 
Congress, spurred by a powerful, industry-driven, lobbying campaign, 
enacted the Dietary Supplement Health and Safety Act of 1994 
(“DSHEA”),15 which mandated a new, less stringent, regulatory framework 
for dietary supplements.16  This congressional preemption of FDA authority 
hampered the FDA’s ability to keep harmful dietary supplements from 
reaching consumers while simultaneously allowing even more quasi-
pharmaceutical substances on the market.17 
Now the question arises: is the FDA again in danger of “being 
DSHEA’ed”?18  The FDA and Congress should avoid a repeat of the dietary 
supplement saga and also draw lessons from the regulatory approach in that 
field.19  The field of mobile health apps may be the most disruptive and 
important development in the health care sector in decades, so it is 
imperative that consumers can trust the mHealth market and rely on the 
FDA to protect consumers from faulty or dangerous mobile medical apps.20 
                                                          
 10.  See, e.g., Vincent J. Roth, The mHealth Conundrum: Smartphones & Mobile Medical 
Apps—How Much FDA Medical Device Regulation Is Required?, 15 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 359, 370 
(2014) (determining that the growth of mHealth necessitates a new, streamlined regulatory process 
that avoids the current regulatory pitfalls that impede innovation); Sen. Deb Fischer & Sen. Angus 
King, FDA’s Slow Process Hurts Innovation: Column, USA TODAY (Feb. 15, 2014), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2014/02/15/fischer-king-health-information-
technology/5464693/ (expressing concern that the FDA’s slow, “heavy-handed” regulatory efforts 
will delay technological development of beneficial mobile health apps). 
 11.  Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301–399 (2012). 
 12.  See infra Part I.A.3. 
 13.  See infra Part I.B. 
 14.  See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. 33,690, 33,697 (proposed June 18, 
1993) (highlighting the new-found risks associated with certain dietary supplements and 
proposing that they be regulated as drugs). 
 15.  Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 
4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.). 
 16.  See infra Parts I.B.2–3. 
 17.  See infra Part I.B.3. 
 18.  Margaret Gilhooley, Deregulation and the Administrative Role: Looking at Dietary 
Supplements, 62 MONT. L. REV. 85, 89 (2001).  In her article, Professor Gilhooley raised the 
possibility of DSHEA-like congressional deregulation in areas other than dietary supplements and 
suggested that this prospect may influence the FDA to collaborate more with regulated entities.  
Id. 
 19.  See infra Part II.A. 
 20.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (insisting FDA oversight is important to help 
patients and doctors evaluate the usefulness and quality of mobile health apps); Terry, supra note 
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Instead of preempting the FDA in the mobile health app field, 
Congress should enable the FDA to form an internal sub-agency of experts 
in mobile technology—the Office of mHealth.21  This team of experts 
should spearhead the FDA’s efforts to regulate mobile health apps, 
coordinate with other federal agencies, and initiate precedent-making 
enforcement actions.22  By leveraging this expertise, the FDA can be a more 
efficient regulator in a developing area of healthcare that is in desperate 
need of guidance.23 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Mobile health apps present novel benefits yet also new dangers to 
consumers and patients.24  Without effective regulation, the mobile health 
app world could quickly turn into a market for “digital snake oil,” making it 
difficult for consumers or physicians to trust an otherwise useful 
technological development.25  Even worse, malfunctioning apps could lead 
to serious physical harm.26  After receiving stakeholder input, the FDA 
released a guidance document in 2013 outlining its intended approach to 
regulate certain “mobile medical apps.”27  However, the FDA faced 
opposition from industry players and members of Congress who wished to 
delay FDA action and limit the FDA’s influence on the mobile health app 
field.28 
Wishing to proceed with caution in a new field while also pleasing 
diverse stakeholders, the FDA continues to recalculate and redefine its role 
regulating mobile health apps.29  The current state of regulatory 
                                                          
5, at 757–58 (claiming mobile health apps are the exception to HIT’s general failure to disrupt 
health care).  
 21.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 22.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 23.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 24.  See infra Part I.A.1.  
 25.  See Nathan Cortez, The FDA Needs to Regulate “Digital Snake Oil,” SLATE (Sept. 24, 
2013), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2013/09/24/mhealth_fda_needs_to_regulate_digital_sna
ke_oil.html (comparing ineffective health apps to snake oil and arguing that Congress should 
empower the FDA to regulate mHealth in order to boost consumer confidence and further 
innovation). 
 26.  See infra Part I.A.1. 
 27.  See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 4.  The FDA received over 130 
comments in response to the draft of the MMA Guidance.  See Examining Federal Regulation of 
Mobile Medical Apps and Other Health Software: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Health of 
the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 9 (2013) (statement of Jeffrey Shuren, 
Director, Center for Devices and Radiological Health, U.S. Food & Drug Admin.), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ucm375462.htm [hereinafter Statement of Jeffrey 
Shuren]. 
 28.  See infra Part I.A.3. 
 29.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
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uncertainty30 in the mobile health app landscape parallels another time of 
upheaval when Congress rejected the FDA’s proposed limitations on 
dietary supplements two decades ago.31  Thus an understanding of the 
enactment and consequences of the Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act of 1994 (“DSHEA”) can aid the discussion of possible 
solutions for the regulation of mobile health apps.32 
A.  The FDA’s Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps and Congressional 
Response 
Although the FDA regulated mobile health apps before 2013, the 
dramatic increase in availability and use of mobile health apps led the FDA 
to more formally define its regulatory approach to those apps.33  The FDA 
revealed its intended regulatory strategy in two sources: the Mobile Medical 
Application Guidance (2013) and the Food and Drug Administration Safety 
and Innovation Act Health IT Report34 (“FDASIA Health IT Report”) 
(2014), which further outlines the agency’s goals for regulating health 
information technology (“HIT”), including mobile health apps.35  Although 
some stakeholders responded positively to FDA participation,36 others, 
including members of both houses of Congress, envisioned a more limited 
role for the FDA, evidenced by three proposed statutes: the Medical 
Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act of 
2014 (“MEDTECH Act”),37 the Preventing Regulatory Overreach to 
Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014 (“PROTECT Act”),38 and the 
Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency 
Act of 2013 (“SOFTWARE Act”).39  All of these proposed statutes suggest 
                                                          
 30.  See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity et al. to Congress, 1 (Oct. 7, 2014), available at 
http://www.healthitnow.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Multi-Group-FDASIA-Letter-to-
Congress.pdf (“We are concerned that there is significant confusion in the market about what 
technologies may be regulated, by which agencies, and to what standards.”). 
 31.  See infra Part I.B. 
 32.  See infra Part I.B. 
 33.  See Statement of Christy L. Foreman, supra note 3, at 17.  
 34.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. ET AL., FDASIA HEALTH IT REPORT: PROPOSED STRATEGY 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A RISK-BASED FRAMEWORK 3 (2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/OfficeofMedicalProductsandTobacco/
CDRH/CDRHReports/UCM391521.pdf [hereinafter FDASIA HEALTH IT REP.]. 
 35.  See infra Part I.A.2. 
 36.  For example, Omri Shor, the CEO of MediSafe Project, which sells a medication 
reminder app, anticipated that the FDA would “take away a lot of the crap that’s in the space.”  
Franzen, supra note 7. 
 37.  Medical Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act, S. 2977, 
113th Cong. (2014). 
 38.  Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 
113th Cong. (2014). 
 39.  Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, 
H.R. 3303, 113th Cong. (2013). 
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amending the FDCA to remove certain types of software used in mobile 
health apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction.40 
1.  What Are Mobile Health Apps and Why Should They Be 
Regulated? 
Mobile health apps are quickly becoming the darling of the HIT world 
with major tech companies investing in mHealth products such as 
wearables.41  Some mobile health apps allow users to have more control 
over their own health and wellbeing, while others act as useful tools for 
medical professionals.42  Ranging from calorie counters to mobile 
ultrasound imaging devices, the wide-ranging capabilities of mobile health 
apps are astounding.43  While the potential benefits and uses of mobile 
health apps are many, they are beyond the scope of this Comment.44 
Mobile health apps also pose significant risks.45  Unlike traditional 
medical devices marketed to and used primarily by trained medical 
professionals, mobile health apps are widely available to the average 
consumer who likely has limited medical knowledge.46  Consumer access to 
MMAs through smartphones, tablets, and other mobile platforms continues 
                                                          
 40.  See infra notes 138–141 and accompanying text.  
 41.  See Krouse, supra note 1, at 740 (discussing the large corporations such as Verizon, 
AT&T, and Apple, that have invested in medical technologies); cf. Mike Feibus, 2015: The Year 
of Health Care for Wearables, USA TODAY (Jan. 5, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/2015/01/02/wearables-fitness-is-name-of-the-
game-but-healthcare-is-where-its-at/21190395/ (predicting that apps and wearables will become 
more oriented toward healthcare, rather than fitness, in the coming year).  
 42.  See RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, supra note 2, at 7 (“Today’s mHealth app publishers and 
Wannabes predominantly target chronically ill patients (31%) and health and fitness-interested 
people (28%).  As primary users, physicians are targeted by 14% of app developers.”). 
 43.  See, e.g., Katie Matlack, 5 Medical Peripherals for the iPad or iPhone, THE PROFITABLE 
PRACTICE (Jan. 26, 2012), http://profitable-practice.softwareadvice.com/5-medical-peripherals-
for-the-ipad-or-iphone-1012612/ (describing the MobiUS SP1 Ultrasound Imaging Device, a 
portable ultrasound device that connects to a phone or other mobile platform to scan and send 
images).  Another example is the iPhoneECG Electrocardiogram, an app that uses electrodes built 
into a smartphone cover that you can place on your heart or finger to record and transmit data into 
the smartphone to later send to an expert to analyze.  Id.  For a description of the different 
categories of mobile health apps, see Nathan Cortez, The Mobile Health Revolution?, 47 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1173, 1182–90 (2014). 
 44.  For a discussion of the benefits of mobile health apps see Cortez, supra note 43, at 1190–
1200.  
 45.  See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 6–7 (“As is the case with 
traditional medical devices, certain mobile medical apps can pose potential risks to public 
health.”).  
 46.  See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1187–88 (“Notably, many customizer apps generally target 
medical professionals and students, though nothing prevents lay users from downloading them.”); 
Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22 (citing study that found that fifty-nine percent of mobile health 
users said apps and other mobile technologies have replaced visits to health care providers, 
suggesting increased vulnerability to inaccurate or deceptive mobile health apps). 
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to increase, creating heightened opportunities for both risks and benefits.47  
Not all apps present the same level of risk.48  An app that tracks a runner’s 
steps may not pose a significant health risk if it makes a mistake, but an app 
that acts as the “central command” for a glucose meter for a diabetic patient 
may have deadly consequences were it to malfunction.49  Similarly, an app 
that functions as a medical device normally only found in a hospital may 
pose more risk to an untrained consumer than a health clinician who is 
trained to use that sort of a device.50  Without the need for a prescription or 
professional input, mobile apps provide health advice and treatment to 
consumers in an unregulated space.51  Indeed, this ease of access is one of 
the benefits of mobile health apps, but also one of its dangers.52 
Many apps are developed without any clinician or expert input, posing 
the risk of erroneous or malfunctioning apps that may harm patients.53  
“‘Virtually any app that claims it will cure someone of a disease, condition 
or mental health condition is bogus,’ says John Grohol, an expert in online 
health technology, pointing out that the vast majority of apps have not been 
scientifically tested.”54  According to Morgan Reed, the Executive Director 
                                                          
 47.  See Roth, supra note 10, at 364–65, 415–18 (identifying a phenomenon called 
“marketplace interposition” which “occurs where commerce (in this case technological 
advancement) encourages society to tacitly permit self-treatment and the unauthorized practice of 
medicine through consumer access and actual use” and using that phenomenon to explain the risks 
of the consumer-focused aspect of the mobile health app market). 
 48.  See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 12 (“While many mobile apps carry 
minimal or no risk to patients, a small subset of these apps can pose significant risks to patients if 
they don’t operate correctly.”). 
 49.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA NEWS RELEASE, FDA ISSUES FINAL GUIDANCE 
ON MOBILE MEDICAL APPS (2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm369431.htm (discussing 
the different levels of risk presented by different mobile health apps). 
 50.  See Morgan Reed, Exec. Dir. of ACT, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-
Based Regulatory Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 21 (May 13, 
2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (“So, the exact same sensor, the same functionality, the same capability in different hands 
has different implications to the patient safety and to improving patient outcomes.”). 
 51.  Roth, supra note 10, at 415 (finding that the marketplace is “rejecting the federal 
prohibition against self-treatment” and “state prohibition of the unauthorized practice of 
medicine”). 
 52.  See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1178–79 (arguing that the benefits of mobile health apps, 
such as their consumer focus, will not reach their full potential unless the apps are “subjected to a 
healthy dose of skepticism from federal regulators”).  
 53.  See Thomas Lorchan Lewis & Jeremy C. Wyatt, mHealth and Mobile Medical Apps: A 
Framework to Assess Risk and Promote Safer Use, 16 J. MED. INTERNET RES. 210 (2014), 
available at http://www.jmir.org/2014/9/e210/ (“[M]any app developers have little or no formal 
medical training and do not involve clinicians in the development process and may therefore be 
unaware of patient safety issues raised by inappropriate app content or functioning.”). 
 54.  Rochelle Sharpe, Many Health Apps Are Based on Flimsy Science at Best, and They 
Often Do Not Work, WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2012), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/many-health-apps-are-based-on-flimsy-
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of ACT, an app-developer association,55 the thousands of apps that make 
these types of claims set “a really dangerous expectation that this device 
will cure you.”56  This type of misinformation may lead users to not seek 
medical help even when it is desperately needed.57 
Even when apps are developed with adequate professional input, 
malfunctions are still a real danger.58  For example, in 2011, Pfizer 
conducted a voluntary recall for its rheumatoid arthritis calculator app 
because it gave faulty results.59  And in 2012, Sanofi Aventis voluntarily 
recalled its Diamago diabetes app through an Apple “push notification” 
because of a software error that could cause the app to “miscalculate an 
insulin dose potentially resulting in dangerously low or high blood glucose 
levels in diabetic patients.”60  In February 2010, the FDA revealed it had 
reports of 260 malfunctions, 44 injuries, and 6 deaths related to HIT, which, 
although not entirely attributable to mobile health apps, illustrate the 
potential and indeed, real, risks of software-enabled medical devices.61 
Still, the push for medical clinicians to incorporate mobile 
technologies and mobile health apps into their practices is increasing.62  Dr. 
Peter Pronovost, the senior vice president for patient safety and quality for 
                                                          
science-at-best-and-they-often-do-not-work/2012/11/12/11f2eb1e-0e37-11e2-bd1a-
b868e65d57eb_story.html.  One study found that a significant percentage of therapeutic apps 
tested relied on a cellphone’s sounds, light, or phone vibrations for treatments—all methods which 
scientists claim are useless in treating the intended conditions.  Id. 
 55.  ACT | The App Association is “an international grassroots advocacy and education 
organization representing more than 5,000 small and mid-size app developers and information 
technology firms.”  ACT | THE APP ASSOCIATION, http://actonline.org/about/ (last visited Jan. 4, 
2015). 
 56.  Reed, supra note 50, at 40. 
 57.  See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 12 (“An inaccurate or malfunctioning 
mobile medical app that uses a sensor to diagnose skin cancer or to measure critically low blood 
oxygen levels in chronic lung disease patients, could delay lifesaving diagnosis and treatment.”).   
 58.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 373 (giving examples of apps that have been recalled 
due to malfunctions).  During 2014, the FDA recalled at least five medical devices involving 
software, including an ARKON Anesthesia Delivery System with 2.0 Software (software defect 
caused system to stop working) and a Puritan Bennett 840 Series Ventilator (software problem).  
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 2014 MEDICAL DEVICE RECALLS, available at 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/Safety/ListofRecalls/ucm384921.htm (last updated Mar. 5, 
2015). 
 59.  Veronica Hackethal, 10 Top Mobile Apps for Rheumatoid Arthritis, RHEUMATOLOGY 
NETWORK (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.rheumatologynetwork.com/rheumatoid-arthritis/10-top-
mobile-apps-rheumatoid-arthritis. 
 60.  Cortez, supra note 43, at 1210 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., CLASS 2 RECALL: SANOFI AVENTIS DIAMIGO IPHONE APP, (2012), available at 
http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfRES/res.cfm?id=114792 (announcing the 
recall).  
 61.  Cortez, supra note 43, at 1228.  
 62.  Cf. Nayana Davis, The RX You Fill at the App Store, FAST COMPANY (Aug. 13, 2014), 
http://www.fastcompany.com/3034306/healthware/the-rx-you-fill-at-the-app-store (describing the 
development of a prescription app and viewing how it is incorporated into professional practice). 
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Johns Hopkins Medicine, “hear[s] pitches for several [apps] every week.”63  
Nevertheless, physicians and other health care providers have generally 
been reluctant to incorporate mobile health apps and other types of mHealth 
into their practices because of some of the same risks explained above.64  
However, as a younger, more tech-savvy generation of health care 
professionals enters the field, new technologies such as mobile health apps 
will begin to play a more prominent role.65  This increased reliance on 
mobile health app technology worries some interest groups who ask, “what 
happens when software ends up making very complex decisions and the 
physicians, either because time does not permit or because the software 
does not reveal enough to be evaluated, end up deferring to the software?”66  
This very question led some stakeholders to ask for more, rather than less, 
FDA oversight.67 
2.  The FDA Suggests a Limited Regulatory Approach to Mobile 
Medical Apps 
Recognizing the challenge posed by mobile health apps, the FDA 
attempted to clarify its position on these devices.68  The FDA first released 
the final Mobile Medical Application Guidance (“MMA Guidance”) in 
2013, declaring that it would regulate a subset of mobile health apps that 
posed the most risk to patients and users.69  Additionally, the FDASIA 
                                                          
 63.  Id.  
 64.  See Dayton, supra note 6, at 721; see also Ryan Faas, Why Your Doctor Doesn’t Want 
You Using iPhone and iPad Health Apps, CULT OF MAC (June 20, 2012), 
http://www.cultofmac.com/174776/why-your-doctor-doesnt-want-you-using-iphone-and-ipad-
health-apps/ (identifying physicians’ concerns that they would not be able to ensure that patients 
properly use mobile health apps and that patients would soon avoid regular healthcare visits).  
 65.  Katie Hafner, Redefining Medicine with Apps and iPads, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/09/science/redefining-medicine-with-apps-and-ipads-the-
digital-doctor.html?pagewanted=all (“The proliferation of gadgets, apps and Web-based 
information has given clinicians—especially young ones like Dr. Rajkomar, who is 28—a black 
bag of new tools: new ways to diagnose symptoms and treat patients, to obtain and share 
information, to think about what it means to be both a doctor and a patient.”). 
 66.  See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., EXAMPLES OF SOFTWARE THAT 
WOULD BE DEREGULATED UNDER THE PROTECT ACT 3 (2014), available at 
http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/newsletter/fiercehealthit/protectactexamplesV1.pdf 
[hereinafter EXAMPLES]. 
 67.  See Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Tom Harkin, 
Chairman of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions (Feb. 14, 2014), available 
at http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/newsletter/fiercehealthit/protectconsumer.pdf (opposing 
proposed restrictions of FDA authority under the PROTECT Act of 2014). 
 68.  See generally MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1 (non-binding guidance 
document for agency and industry use).  
 69.  See infra Part I.A.2.a. 
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Health IT Report, released in early 2014, reiterated the agency’s view that 
the FDA should limit its oversight to only a small portion of apps.70 
a.  FDA Mobile Medical App Guidance 
The FDA’s approach in the area of HIT and mobile health app 
regulation has been characterized as informal, incremental, and restrained.71  
By the time the FDA released the MMA Guidance in September 201372, the 
agency was already regulating mobile-based software and had reviewed 
over 100 mobile health apps.73  The MMA Guidance declares that the FDA 
will actively regulate only a limited category of apps that fit the FDCA’s 
definition of a “device.”74  The MMA Guidance also describes a risk-based 
regulatory scheme that stresses what the FDA will not regulate.75  For 
example, the FDA will not regulate the sale of mobile platforms76 such as 
smartphones, and it will not apply any regulatory requirements to 
companies that solely distribute apps, such as the iTunes App Store or 
Google Play.77  According to the MMA Guidance, the FDA will only 
regulate “mobile medical app[s],” which are mobile apps that (1) act “as an 
accessory to a regulated medical device” or (2) “transform a mobile 
platform into a regulated medical device.” 78 
Using these parameters, the MMA Guidance separates all mobile 
health apps into three categories: (1) apps that do not meet the definition of 
“device” and will not be regulated, (2) apps that may meet the definition of 
“device” but pose such low risk that the FDA will exercise “enforcement 
                                                          
 70.  See FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 4 (claiming the “FDA would focus its 
attention and oversight on medical device health IT functionality, such as computer aided 
detection software, remote display or notification of real-time alarms from bedside monitors, and 
robotic surgical planning and control”).  
 71.  See, e.g., Nathan Cortez, Regulating Disruptive Innovation, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
175, 190–91, 194 (2014) (arguing that the FDA’s use of “threats” to regulate software has been 
counterproductive). 
 72.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1. 
 73.  Statement of Christy L. Foreman, supra note 3, at 17.  The FDA-approved MMAs 
included “remote blood pressure, heart rhythm, and patient monitors, and smartphone-based 
ultrasounds, EKG machines, and glucose monitors.”  Id. 
 74.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 4. 
 75.  The MMA Guidance spends approximately twelve pages covering apps and 
manufacturers that will not be regulated by the FDA. E.g., id. at 12–13, 20–25.  See also 
Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 14–15 (“Just as important as what the policy does is 
what the policy does not do.”). 
 76.  Mobile platforms are “commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) computing platforms, with or 
without wireless connectivity, that are handheld in nature,” including smartphones, tablet 
computers, and portable computers.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 7. 
 77.  Id. at 9. 
 78.  Id. at 4, 7.  The FDA will provide “regulatory oversight to only those mobile apps that 
are medical devices and whose functionality could pose a risk to a patient’s safety if the mobile 
app were not function as intended.  This subset of mobile apps the FDA refers to as mobile 
medical apps.”  Id. at 4. 
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discretion”79 over them, and (3) apps that will be regulated because they 
meet the definition of “device” and may pose a higher risk to patients were 
the app to malfunction.80  Using this scheme, the FDA has cleared over 
forty MMAs81 and taken one enforcement action related to MMAs since 
2011.82 
The FDA declares it will not regulate simple educational or 
administrative apps.83  If an app is not intended to diagnose or treat a 
patient, the FDA does not consider it to be a medical device.84  Similarly, 
the FDA will not enforce regulations against the “enforcement discretion” 
category of low-risk apps, which includes apps that provide access to 
electronic health records, communicate information to providers, or provide 
tools to users to organize and track health information.85 
Instead, the FDA will focus its oversight on the subset designated as 
mobile medical apps.86  This category includes mobile apps that connect to 
medical devices in order to control the device, such as an app that controls a 
                                                          
 79. Id. at 15.  Enforcement discretion means the FDA “does not intend to enforce” the 
regulatory requirements of the FDCA on this category of apps for now.  Id. 
 80.  Id. at 13. 
 81.  CTR. FOR DEVICES AND RADIOLOGICAL HEALTH, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
NARRATIVE BY ACTIVITY 86 (2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/ReportsManualsForms/Reports/BudgetReports/UCM3
94762.pdf.  For example, the FDA cleared BlueStar, a prescription-only mobile app designed to 
assist patients with Type-II diabetes to manage their disease.  Davis, supra note 62. 
 82.  In May 2013, the FDA sent an “It Has Come to Our Attention” Letter to Biosense 
Technologies Ltd., developer of an app called uChek that allows users to take a picture of 
urinalysis test strips with a smartphone and then identifies substances to deliver a result to the 
patient.  uChek had not been submitted to the FDA for clearance even though the FDA thought it 
fit the definition of a medical device.  Letter from James L. Woods, Deputy Dir., Patient Safety 
and Prod. Quality, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., to Myshkin Ingawale, Biosense Technologies 
Private Ltd. (May 2013), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/ResourcesforYou/Industry/ucm353513.htm; see also 
Christian Farr, The FDA Launches First Inquiry into Medical iPhone App, VENTUREBEAT.COM 
(May 29 2013), http://venturebeat.com/2013/05/29/the-fda-launches-first-inquiry-into-medical-
iphone-app/ (discussing the FDA’s letter to Biosense).  The FDA only addressed uChek’s non-
conformance after the app was featured in a TED talk even though the app had been offered for 
years without FDA clearance.  This example highlights the FDA’s current inability to adequately 
police the mammoth-sized world of mobile health apps.  The company eventually recalled uChek 
and retreated to foreign markets because it could not afford to go through the regulatory process.  
FELLAY, supra note 5, at 6.  
 83.  See id. at 20–22.  Appendix A of the MMA Guidance provides examples of apps that will 
not be regulated by the FDA, such as apps that provide electronic copies of medical reference 
books or automate office functions.  Id.  
 84.  Id. at 20.  
 85.  Id. at 15–18, 23–25.  Under these guidelines, daily exercise and calorie trackers apps may 
technically be medical devices, but will nevertheless not be regulated.  Id. at 24–25.  Appendix B 
of the MMA Guidance provides examples of apps that fall under the enforcement discretion 
category.  Id. at 23–26. 
 86.  Id. at 13. 
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blood pressure cuff.87  The FDA considers this sort of app to be an 
accessory that falls under the same regulations as the parent device.88  The 
MMA may also be an app that transforms a mobile platform, like a 
smartphone or tablet, into a medical device using sensors, display screens, 
or attachments.89  The MMA Guidance gives examples of apps that use 
attachments of a glucose strip reader to transform a mobile platform into a 
glucose meter or apps that use a smartphone’s built-in accelerometer to 
measure movement to monitor sleep apnea.90  Lastly, any mobile app that 
analyzes or diagnoses patients using patient-specific data will fall under 
FDA oversight.91  For instance, an app that uses radiation therapy treatment 
software to calculate dosages of radiation for a particular patient would be 
considered a mobile medical app.92  Apps that fall into the MMA category 
will be classified under the three-class system just as any other medical 
device according to the risk they present.93 
In general, the FDA places all regulated medical devices into three 
classes according to the level of risk presented by the intended use of the 
device.94  A mobile app will be regulated under this medical device class 
system only “[w]hen the intended use of a mobile app is for the diagnosis of 
disease or other conditions, or the cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention 
of disease, or is intended to affect the structure or any function of the body 
of man.”95  Class I devices are those that pose no “potential unreasonable 
risk of illness or injury.”96  Class II devices pose more risk of injury to 
patients and must be under general and “special controls,” including post-
market surveillance.97  Lastly, Class III devices are “represented to be for a 
use in supporting or sustaining human life” or present “a potential 
                                                          
 87.  Id. at 14. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 14–15. 
 90.  Id. at 15.   
 91.  Id.  
 92.  Id.  
 93.  Id. at 13.  Appendix C provides examples of apps that are considered mobile medical 
apps and will be regulated by the FDA.  Id. at 27–29. 
 94.  21 U.S.C. § 360c (2012). 
 95.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 8 (emphasis added).  Intended use is 
the “objective intent of the persons legally responsible for the labeling of devices. . . . shown by 
labeling claims, advertising matter, or oral or written statements by such persons or their 
representatives.”  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 8 n.5 (citing 21 C.F.R. § 
801.4 (2014)).  A mobile medical app manufacturer is “anyone who initiates specifications, 
designs, labels, or creates a software system or application for a regulated medical device in whole 
or from multiple software components.”  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 9.  
For example, an app that makes an LED operate may or may not fall under regulation as a device.  
If the app is intended to be a general light source, it will not be regulated.  However, if the app is 
labeled and marketed to be used by doctors as a light source to examine patients, similar to an 
ophthalmoscope, then it will fall under the FDA’s oversight.  Id. at 8. 
 96.  21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(A). 
 97.  Id. § 360c(a)(1)(B).   
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unreasonable risk of illness or injury.”98  Most manufacturers attempt to 
avoid Class III classification and pre-market approval because it is often a 
long, expensive process requiring substantial amounts of testing and clinical 
trials.99 
To summarize, if a mobile health app does not fall under the definition 
of a “mobile medical app” it will not be regulated by the FDA.100  
Furthermore, some mobile health apps will fall under the “enforcement 
discretion” category and not be regulated either.101  Finally, even the mobile 
health apps that do fall under the riskier, regulated “mobile medical app” 
category will be classified under the general Class I–III system that applies 
to all medical devices, meaning they may only be subject to minimal 
controls.102 
b.  FDASIA Health IT Report 
The much-anticipated FDASIA Health IT Report, released in April 
2014, provided further insight into how federal agencies are approaching 
mobile health apps and HIT in general.103  Section 618 of the Food and 
Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012 (“FDASIA”)104 
commissioned the FDA to write the Report in conjunction with the Federal 
Communications Commission (“FCC”) and the Office of the National 
Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”).105  Congress 
                                                          
 98.  Id. § 360c(a)(1)(C). 
 99.  See FELLAY, supra note 5, at 9–10.  In fact, any type of FDA approval process is often a 
hindrance to device manufacturers.  The first sponsor to submit a new device, especially, is at a 
disadvantage because the new device must go through more initial testing to enter the market, 
whereas future similar devices only have to prove “substantial equivalence” to the first device to 
receive FDA approval.  Id. 
 100.  Id. at 4. 
 101.  Id. at 15–16. 
 102.  Id. at 13.  All MMA manufacturers must meet the generally applicable device regulatory 
requirements such as registering and listing the MMAs they market with the FDA.  Id. at 33.  
MMA manufacturers must also comply with Quality System regulations, which mandate the 
development of safety requirements, procedures to design, produce, and distribute MMAs, and 
verification processes for the MMAs on various mobile platforms.  Id. at 34.  For more 
information on Quality System regulations, see Quality System Requirements, Management 
Responsibility, 21 C.F.R. § 820.20 (2014).   
 103.  See FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 3 (recommending a four-pronged 
approach of fostering safety, leveraging standards, using industry-led testing and certification, and 
creating a learning environment for HIT). 
 104.  Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–144, 
126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  FDASIA amended the 
FDCA.  Id. § 2(b).   
 105.  Id. § 618.  The ONC, an office within the Department for Health and Human Services, 
was first created by executive order in 2004 and later established by the Health Information 
Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act in 2009.  The ONC oversees the 
development of standards and certification criteria for HIT and supports two federal advisory 
committees.  FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 6.  
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instructed these agencies to address “an appropriate, risk-based regulatory 
framework pertaining to HIT, including mobile medical applications, that 
promotes innovation, protects patient safety, and avoids regulatory 
duplication.”106  Under the direction of the statute, the agencies formed a 
FDASIA Workgroup consisting of a representative of each of the three 
agencies involved, plus twenty-eight individuals from the general public.107 
Overall, the Report continued the theme of deemphasizing the FDA’s 
role in HIT regulation.108  Again, the Report stressed that no “new or 
additional mandatory conformity assessments” should be required before a 
new HIT device is allowed to be marketed or used.109  The Report 
concluded that “a limited, narrowly-tailored approach that primarily relies 
on ONC-coordinated activities and private sector capabilities is prudent,” 
implying these options were preferred over FDA oversight.110  Other 
methods, such as industry-led certification and development of best 
practices, were emphasized, rather than a regulation-first approach.111  The 
Report’s authors also envisioned more cooperation with stakeholders and 
the private sector.112  For example, the Report suggests that non-
governmental entities may manage the testing, inspection, and certification 
of mobile health app manufacturers to insure they meet certain minimum 
standards.113 
The authors of the FDASIA Health IT Report also recommended the 
creation of a Health IT Safety Center, a public-private entity formed by the 
ONC, FDA, FCC, and Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality with 
input from other agencies and IT stakeholders.114  The Center is meant to 
involve stakeholders in gathering the scientific evidence and data necessary 
to create HIT safety goals and educate the HIT community on best practices 
and patient safety.115  Beyond mentioning that the Center would require “a 
                                                          
 106.  FDASIA § 618(a) (emphasis added). 
 107.  FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 7.  The public members included “experts 
representing patients, consumers, health care providers, startup companies, health plans, venture 
capitalists, IT and health IT vendors, small businesses, purchasers, and employers.”  Id. 
 108.  Id. at 3 (“[N]o new or additional areas of FDA oversight are needed.”). 
 109.  Id. at 20 (emphasis added).  Rather, the assessment tools will simply distinguish between 
the products and organizations that create high quality products meeting the minimum standards 
and those that do not.  Id. 
 110.  Id. 
 111.  See id. (“[A] better approach is to foster the development of a culture of safety and 
equality; leverage standards and best practices; employ industry-led testing and certification; and 
selectively use tools such as voluntary listing, reporting, and training to enable the development of 
a healthcare environment that is transparent and promotes learning to foster continual health IT 
improvement.”). 
 112.  See id. at 29 (“[T]he Agencies intend to continue active engagement with stakeholders in 
an ongoing collaborative effort to implement a health IT framework . . . .”).  
 113.  Id. at 21.  
 114.  Id. at 14–15.  
 115.  Id.  
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strong governance mechanism,” the Report did not specify how this entity 
would be formed, what its authority would be, if any, and how it would 
operate.116  Ultimately, the FDASIA Report demonstrated that there is no 
consensus on who should be making the guidelines or standards for 
regulation of mobile health apps—the FDA, non-governmental entities, or 
perhaps both—and that more information on mHealth is needed.117 
After the release of the FDASIA Health IT Report, the FDA began 
adjusting its regulation of HIT.  In June 2014, the FDA issued another 
guidance document (“MDDS Guidance”), which it finalized in February 
2015,118 declaring it would not enforce its prior regulations of medical 
device data systems (“MDDS”),119 medical image storage devices, and 
medical image communication devices.120  The MDDS Guidance stated 
“the FDA has gained additional experience with these types of 
technologies, and has determined that these devices pose a low risk to the 
public.”121  The MDDS Guidance also affected the MMA Guidance since 
the latter originally contemplated the regulation of apps that served MDDS 
functions.122 
Even after the FDA explained its regulatory intentions through the 
MMA Guidance, the FDASIA Report, and public workshops,123 
                                                          
 116.  Id. 
 117.  See id. at 22 (questioning the role of the government and non-governmental entities in 
making decisions about possible assessment tools for HIT); accord Transcript of Panel B at 148–
49, Public Workshop—Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information 
Technology (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (discussing the possible role of stakeholders versus the federal agencies to write 
accountability rules for HIT).   
 118.  U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY AND FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION STAFF: MEDICAL DEVICE DATA SYSTEMS, MEDICAL IMAGE STORAGE 
DEVICES, AND MEDICAL IMAGE COMMUNICATIONS DEVICES (2015), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocume
nts/UCM401996.pdf [hereinafter MDDS GUIDANCE]. 
 119.  Medical Device Data Systems are “hardware or software products that transfer, store, 
convert formats, and display medical device data.  . . . MDDS are not intended to be used in 
connection with active patient monitoring.”  Id. at 5. 
 120.  Id. at 4.  
 121.  Id.  The MDDS Guidance affected the 2011 Medical Device Data Systems Final Rule 
that lowered MDDS from Class III to Class I. Medical Device Data System Rule, 21 
C.F.R. § 880.6310 (2014). 
 122.  The MMA Guidance was updated and reissued on February 9, 2015, to reflect the 
changes relating to MDDS. MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 1.  
 123.  The FDA hosted public workshops in 2011 and 2014 to discuss the FDA’s proposed 
regulatory framework for HIT and MMAs.  See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC 
WORKSHOP—MOBILE MEDICAL APPLICATIONS DRAFT GUIDANCE (2011), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm267821.htm (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2015); U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., PUBLIC WORKSHOP—PROPOSED RISK-
BASED REGULATORY FRAMEWORK AND STRATEGY FOR HEALTH INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 
(2014), 
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stakeholders still believe the mobile health app regulatory landscape is 
unstable.124  Multiple healthcare and technology organizations wrote a letter 
to Congress in October 2014 calling for increased “statutory clarity and a 
stable foundation” for the continued growth of HIT innovation in contrast to 
the “[c]urrent regulatory uncertainty [that] stifles health care innovation.”125  
In fact, Congress had already been considering different measures that 
would affect the regulation of mobile health apps.126 
3.  Congress and Stakeholders React to FDA Regulation of Mobile 
Health Apps 
As the FDA works to solidify MMA regulation, stakeholders and 
Congress are unsure how much authority the FDA should have in that area.  
While the FDA was still receiving stakeholder comments on the proposed 
MMA Guidance in 2012, some members of Congress attempted to slow 
down the regulatory process out of fear that regulation would halt 
innovation and expansion.127  Many stakeholders encouraged these 
congressional slow-down efforts.128  Individuals within the HIT industry 
“believe[d] that any new set of regulations, no matter how well-intentioned 
in development, [would] likely have unintended consequences or lead to a 
regulatory land grab.”129  Not all stakeholders, however, supported these 
efforts to stall the MMA Guidance.130  For example, the mHealth 
                                                          
http://www.fda.gov/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/ucm392877.htm (last 
visited Jan. 14, 2015). 
 124.  See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity, supra note 30, at 1 (informing Congress that 
uncertainties in the HIT market are creating barriers to innovation). 
 125.  Id. at 1–2. 
 126.  See infra Part I.A.3. 
 127.  See Brian Dolan, How Congress Almost Delayed the FDA’s Mobile Medical App 
Guidance, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (July 5, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/17707/how-congress-
almost-delayed-the-fdas-mobile-app-guidance/.  Senator Michael Bennet (D) proposed an 
amendment that would impose a “year-long moratorium on [the MMA Guidance] so that HHS 
and an outside working group of various stakeholders can work together on a report to Congress 
to help us do the proper due diligence on this issue.”  Id.  But see Health Information 
Technologies: Harnessing Wireless Innovation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commc’n 
and Techn. of the Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 5 (2013) (statement of Rep. 
Doris O. Matsui) (stating that the FDA MMA Guidance should be finalized quickly in order to 
provide clarity and boost investor confidence). 
 128.  See Dolan, supra note 127 (interviewing Joel White, Executive Director of the Health IT 
Now Coalition, which represents large corporations such as Verizon and Aetna, who supported the 
Bennet-Hatch Amendment’s requirement to seek stakeholder advice, asserting “external input is 
critical”).   
 129.  Id.  One industry representative made the following comment: “Does the FDA really 
have any teeth?  Do we really need a finalized guidance document?  Look at how quickly mobile 
health has grown in the past year, the past two years.”  Id. 
 130.  See Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, on Bennet-
Hatch Amendment to Senator Tom Harkin, Chairman, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and 
Pensions, and Senator Michael B. Enzi, Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, and Pensions 1–2 (May 
17, 2012), available at http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-
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Regulatory Commission (“MRC”)131 believed a finalized MMA Guidance 
would actually benefit the HIT industry because it would decrease the 
uncertainty that halted further innovation.132  Ultimately, the resulting 
legislation, FDASIA, did not stall the FDA’s issuance of the MMA 
Guidance.133 
Still, Congress continued to attempt to craft a statutory barrier to 
diminish FDA regulation of mobile health apps.  The release of the final 
MMA Guidance was preceded by a bill proposed in the House of 
Representatives, the SOFTWARE Act of 2013,134 and followed by a similar 
bill in the Senate, the PROTECT Act of 2014.135  Both bills concerned the 
FDA’s authority to regulate mobile health apps.  Bradley Merrill 
Thompson, counsel for the MRC and part of the FDASIA workgroup, 
surmised that Congress was trying to frustrate the efforts of the FDA with 
these bills, particularly because the PROTECT Act was introduced so soon 
after the MMA Guidance and shortly before the release of the expected 
FDASIA Health IT Report.136  Then, on December 4, 2014, Senators Orrin 
                                                          
Letter-to-Senate-HELP-Committee-on-Proposed-Moratorium-FINAL.pdf (opposing the 
amendment that would stall FDA action, claiming that the amendment would stall job creation and 
innovation in the HIT sector because of regulatory confusion). 
 131.  The MRC represents mHealth stakeholders including medical device manufacturers, app 
developers, telecommunications providers, and non-profit health associations, such as AT&T, 
Verizon Wireless, Continua Health Alliance, Voxiva, MedApps, and many more.  Id. at 2.  About 
Us, MHEALTH REGULATORY COMMISSION, http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/about-us/ (last 
visited Jan. 4, 2015). 
 132.  See Letter from Bradley Merrill Thompson, mHealth Regulatory Coalition, on FDA 
Guidance to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Dept. of Health and Human Services (June 21, 2013), 
available at http://mobihealthnews.com/wp-content/pdf/MRCforFDAfinalguidance.pdf (“writing 
on behalf of the mHealth Regulatory Coalition (“MRC”) to encourage HHS, through FDA, to 
publish the final guidance on mobile medical apps as soon as reasonably possible”). 
 133.  Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–144, 
§ 618(a), 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  Instead FDASIA 
required the FDA, ONC, and FCC to work with external stakeholders to create and publish a 
report advising how to regulate health IT so that the government could keep tabs on the agency’s 
regulatory efforts.  See supra Part I.A.2.b.  See also Dolan, supra note 127 (discussing the result 
of Senator Bennet’s proposed moratorium).  
 134.  Sensible Oversight for Technology which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, 
H.R. 3303, 113th Cong. (2013).  See Christina Farr, Congress Wants to Kick the FDA out of 
Digital Health with This New Bill, VENTUREBEAT, (Feb. 26, 2014), 
http://venturebeat.com/2014/02/26/new-digital-health-bill-proposes-to-undermine-the-fda-draws-
mixed-reactions/.  Representative Blackburn stated that she plans to reintroduce an updated 
version of the SOFTWARE Act in 2015.  Dan Bowman, Orrin Hatch: MEDTECH Act Vital to 
Protecting Healthcare Innovation, FIERCEHEALTHIT (Dec. 5, 2014), 
http://www.fiercehealthit.com/story/orrin-hatch-medtech-act-vital-protecting-healthcare-
innovation/2014-12-05. 
 135.  Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 
113th Cong. (2014) (introduced Feb. 10, 2014). 
 136.  Farr, supra note 134.  Thompson stated, “[t]he September guidance was greeted with 
relief and fanfare. . . . Most people who read [the Guidance] said it’s a sensible approach, [so] why 
are we legislating to undo that?”  Id.   
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Hatch (R) and Michael Bennet (D) introduced another bill concerning the 
regulation of mobile health apps, the MEDTECH Act of 2014.137 
All three bills seek to amend the FDCA, the FDA’s source of authority 
to regulate medical devices, by placing certain types of medical software 
out of the FDA’s regulatory reach.138  The SOFTWARE Act proposed to 
limit the FDA’s jurisdiction to “medical software,” excluding “clinical” or 
“health software.”139  If enacted, the SOFTWARE Act would limit the 
FDA’s enforcement discretion and prevent it from regulating software 
products marketed to health care professionals.140  Similarly, the 
MEDTECH Act excludes certain types of low-risk software and mobile 
health apps from FDA regulation.141 
Under the PROTECT Act, at least some MMAs, such as those with 
clinical decision support (“CDS”) software, would not fall under the FDA’s 
jurisdiction.142  Examples of CDS apps include sports concussion apps, 
melanoma detection apps, and drug dose calculator apps that are marketed 
                                                          
 137.  Medical Electronic Data Technology Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act, S. 2977, 
113th Cong. (2014). 
 138.  See S. 2007 § 3(b) (giving the following prohibition: “Clinical software and health 
software shall not be subject to regulation under [the FDCA]”); H.R. 3303 § 4 (amending Section 
201 of the FDCA to exclude health and clinical software); S. 2977 § 2 (defining “device” under 
the FDCA to exclude administrative software, software used for health and conditioning outside 
of a clinical setting, electronic patient records, and more).  
 139.  H.R. 3303 § 2.  Medical software is partially defined as:  
software . . . intended to be marketed for use by consumers and makes 
recommendations for clinical action that—(i) includes the use of a drug, device, or 
procedure to cure or treat a disease or other condition without requiring the involvement 
of a health care provider; and (ii) if followed, would change the structure or any 
function of the body of man or other animals; (2) [but] is not software whose primary 
purpose is integral to the functioning of a drug or device; and (3) is not a component of 
a device.  
Id. 
 140.  See id. § 3(a).  Clinical software, which is removed from the FDA’s jurisdiction under the 
SOFTWARE Act, is defined as:  
clinical decision support software . . . intended for human or animal use that—(A) 
captures, analyzes, changes, or presents patient or population clinical data or 
information and may recommend courses of clinical action, but does not directly 
change the structure or any function of the body of man or other animals; and (B) is 
intended to be marketed for use only by a health care provider in a health care setting.  
Id. 
 141.  S. 2977 § 2.  Specifically, Sen. Hatch, the MEDTECH Act’s author, said, “the bill limits 
and clarifies the FDA’s role regarding regulation of administrative and financial software, 
wellness and lifestyle products, certain aspects of electronic health records and software that aids 
healthcare providers in developing treatment recommendations for their patients.”  Bowman, 
supra note 134. 
 142.  See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (listing 
different software and mobile medical apps that are presently regulated by the FDA but would not 
be under the PROTECT Act of 2014).  
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to consumers to use without involving medical professionals.143  These apps 
pose unique risks to patients, especially when used in an emergency setting, 
leading some HIT stakeholders to object to the bill’s deregulation of CDS 
software.144 
So why is Congress considering overriding the FDA’s current MMA 
framework?  First, some elected officials argue that the FDA’s old 
regulatory methods and statutory mandate are incompatible with new 
technological advances.145  Specifically, the authors of the PROTECT Act 
wrote that the FDCA definition of medical device is “overly broad,” 
“dated,” and “bad news for health IT innovation.”146  The PROTECT Act 
discusses the importance of HIT innovation and the economic impact of 
mobile health: mobile health apps have created over 500,000 new jobs in 
the United States, and it is projected that the market will reach $26 billion 
by 2017.147  Proponents of the Act think Congress must “intervene” in order 
to focus “agency efforts on fostering health information technology and 
mobile health innovation while better protecting patient safety, improving 
health care, and creating jobs in the United States.”148  The PROTECT Act 
names specific agencies, such as the National Institute of Standards and 
Technology, the ONC, and the FCC, to “work on next steps . . . such as 
collaborating with nongovernmental entities to develop certification 
processes and to promote best practice standards.”149  Noticeably absent 
from this list of regulators is the FDA.150 
Not everyone, however, supports these congressional efforts.  
Specifically, the MRC, CDS Coalition, and the Patient, Consumer, and 
Public Health Coalition, oppose the PROTECT Act.151  The latter, a patient 
                                                          
 143.  Id. at 1–2.  Melanoma detection apps are a particularly worrisome category of apps since 
one study found that three out of four melanoma apps incorrectly classified thirty percent of 
melanomas as “unconcerning,” which could potentially leave a dangerous skin condition 
undiscovered and untreated. Joel A. Wolf et al., Diagnostic Inaccuracy of Smartphone 
Applications for Melanoma Detection, 149 JAMA DERMATOLOGY 422, 422 (2013). 
 144.  See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 3 (giving the 
example of Emergency Care Predictive Analytics Software, which processes large amounts of 
healthcare and vital sign data to make a recommendation in an emergency care setting and 
claiming that because “the volume of information that the software considers and the little time 
available to the doctor or EMT, there is no practical way for the physician or EMT to read, 
understand and critically evaluate the basis for the computer’s recommendation”). 
 145.  See, e.g., Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“The FDA’s regulatory footprint is growing 
beyond its statutory shoe size.”). 
 146.  Id.  
 147.  S. 2007 § 2(a). 
 148.  Id. § 2(b). 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  See MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (posing the 
risks presented by the PROTECT Act’s removal of certain software from FDA jurisdiction); 
Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Harkin, supra note 67 
(claiming that millions of Americans may be put at risk if software-reliant devices like MRIs were 
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advocacy group, wrote to Senator Tom Harkin, the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Health, Education, Labor and Pensions, that “[w]e are 
extremely concerned that this bill will deregulate a broad swath of medical 
devices that rely on software and will create opportunities for rampant 
‘gaming’ to avoid regulation.”152  The group thinks that FDA intervention is 
necessary to protect consumers: 
Without [the] FDA to carefully scrutinize the risks and benefits of 
a device, patients’ health may be seriously harmed.  Even if the 
device itself is not harmful, if it is not proven effective, then 
patients could be harmed by inaccurate results that are either 
anxiety-producing or erroneously reassuring; these outcomes 
could result either in unnecessary testing or serious illness or 
death.153 
Yet opponents of the PROTECT Act reacted more positively to the 
more recent MEDTECH Act because it preserved FDA authority over 
medium-risk and high-risk apps.154  Currently, the bills are still in 
committee.155 
B.  FDA Regulation of Dietary Supplements and the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act 
Congress’s concerns and the FDA’s current unstable position in the 
mobile health context are reminiscent of an earlier debate over the 
regulation of dietary supplements in the 1990s.  In 1993, the FDA proposed 
more stringent regulation of certain dietary supplements after they were 
                                                          
no longer regulated by the FDA under the PROTECT Act’s restrictions); see also Greg Slabodkin, 
Industry Group Voices ‘Extreme’ Concern with PROTECT Act, FIERCEMOBILEHEALTHCARE 
(Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/story/industry-group-voices-extreme-
concern-protect-act/2014-02-19 (summarizing the groups’ opposition to the PROTECT Act). 
 152.  Letter from the Patient, Consumer, and Public Health Coalition to Sen. Harkin, supra 
note 67. 
 153.  Id.  
 154.  See Christina Farr, Draft U.S. Legislation Would Curb FDA Medical Software Oversight, 
REUTERS (Nov. 24, 2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/25/fda-technology-
idUSL2N0TE22020141125.  Bradley Thompson called the MEDTECH Act “a straightforward 
and clean approach” that “is less likely to have unintended consequences.”  Id.  
 155.  The SOFTWARE Act died in the House Committee on Energy and Commerce: Health, 
but it will likely be reintroduced in 2015.  H.R. 3303 (113th): Sensible Oversight for Technology 
which Advances Regulatory Efficiency Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr3303 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).  The PROTECT 
Act of 2014 also remains unenacted after being referred to the Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions.  S. 2007 (113th): Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance 
Care Technology Act of 2014, GOVTRACK.US, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2007 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2015).  The MEDTECH Act was also referred to the Senate Committee on 
Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions. S. 2977 (113th): Medical Electronic Data Technology 
Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s2977 (last visited Feb. 5, 2015).  Sen. Hatch plans to 
reintroduce the bill in 2015.  Bowman, supra note 134. 
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linked to serious injury and death.156  The FDA’s proposal was followed by 
industry pushback157 and a swift congressional response—the passage of 
the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994.158  DSHEA 
completely changed the way dietary supplements were regulated and 
hampered the FDA’s ability to protect the public from dangerous and 
ineffective dietary supplements.159 
1.  The FDA Regulated Dietary Supplements Before DSHEA 
The FDA has regulated dietary supplements since 1938.160  Dietary 
supplements include vitamins, minerals, herbal remedies, and amino 
acids161 and can be in gel, capsule, drink, powder, or even energy bar 
form.162  Historically, the FDA classified each dietary supplement either as 
a drug, food additive, or food product based on the claims for intended use 
made by the manufacturer on the labeling.163  If a label made a “drug” claim 
or fell into the food additive category, the FDA required stricter controls 
such as pre-market approval of the supplement, which meant the 
manufacturer had to substantiate its claims by “adequate and well-
controlled investigations.”164  Otherwise, supplements making mere 
nutrition claims could be regulated as foods, which were presumed to be 
safe.165 
Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the extent of regulation over dietary 
supplements fluctuated as the FDA created new regulatory classification 
schemes which were later abandoned due to industry pressure, 
                                                          
 156.  See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,690 (citing the thousands of 
injuries caused by L-tryptophan as motivation to reassess dietary supplement regulation). 
 157.  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 93 (describing the dietary supplement industry’s reaction 
to the FDA’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and how industry efforts led to the passage of 
DSHEA); see also infra Part I.B.2. 
 158.  Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, 108 Stat. 
4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 159.  See infra Part I.B.3. 
 160.  For a brief historical overview of the legislative and regulatory history of dietary 
supplements, see COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, REPORT OF THE COMM’N ON 
DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS 11–13 (1997), available at 
http://www.health.gov/dietsupp/final.pdf. 
 161.  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)(1).  Dietary supplements are defined as “dietary substance[s] 
[used] by man to supplement the diet by increasing the total dietary intake.”  Id.  
 162.  OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS: 
WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW 1 (2011), available at 
http://ods.od.nih.gov/HealthInformation/DS_WhatYouNeedToKnow.aspx. 
 163.  Jennifer Akre Hill, Comment, Creating Balance: Problems Within DSHEA and 
Suggestions for Reform, 2 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 361, 366–67 (2006). 
 164.  21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (1994).  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 89–95 (summarizing the 
pre-DSHEA regulatory framework for dietary supplements). Food additives were required to 
show that the ingredient was “generally recognized as safe” in order to receive pre-market 
approval by the FDA.  Hill, supra note 163, at 367–68. 
 165.  Hill, supra note 163, at 367–68.   
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congressional interference, judicial decrees, or all three.166  Following the 
backlash, the FDA exercised “regulatory restraint” in the 1980s and early 
1990s, which led to an increase in the number of dietary supplements on the 
market.167  In the 1990s, however, when 38 deaths and 1500 other adverse 
events were traced to the uses of L-tryptophan, a non-essential amino acid 
used in supplements, the FDA initiated an investigation into new ways to 
handle the safety issues associated with dietary supplements.168  The FDA 
released an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking that sought stronger 
regulatory features, such as pre-market review for a range of supplements, 
to combat the safety risks posed by many supplement ingredients.169 
2.  Industry Anger and Congressional Pushback: The Enactment of 
DSHEA 
The supplement industry saw the FDA’s recommendations as an 
attempt to drastically reduce the sale and marketing of dietary supplements, 
and the industry started a campaign to ensure that the FDA would not 
succeed.170  For example, retailers held a “Blackout Day” in which they 
covered in black crepe all of the supplements which could potentially be 
taken off the market under a broad FDA regulatory scheme.171  Responding 
to the industry’s concern, members of Congress introduced DSHEA, and 
                                                          
 166.  See id. at 368–70 (giving the history of the FDA’s regulation of dietary supplements 
during the 1960s and 1970s).  For example, when the FDA began regulating high dosages and 
“irrational combinations” of supplements previously treated as “foods,” lobbyists convinced 
Congress to pass the Proxmire Amendment.  Id. at 369.  The Amendment restricted the FDA’s 
authority to regulate supplements based on potency or combination, Pub. L. No. 94-278, § 501, 90 
Stat. 410 (1976) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 350 (1976)).  The Amendment was followed by a 
decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit holding that the FDA could not limit 
potency of supplements under its current authority.  Nat’l Nutritional Foods Ass’n v. Matthews, 
557 F.2d 325, 336 (2d Cir. 1977). 
 167.  Hill, supra note 163, at 370; see also Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 
33,690 (discussing the growth and change in the dietary supplement industry in the early 1990s). 
 168.  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 92; see also Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. 
Reg. at 33,690–91 (explaining that the Dietary Supplement Task Force was created to investigate 
the safety of supplements). 
 169.  See Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,697 (suggesting treating 
dietary supplements containing amino acids as drugs or food additives, which require additional 
FDA oversight); see also COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, supra note 160, at 13 
(summarizing the FDA’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking).  
 170.  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 93 (discussing the dietary supplement industry’s reaction 
to the FDA’s investigation and proposals); see also COMM’N ON DIETARY SUPPLEMENT LABELS, 
supra note 160, at 13 (calling the FDA’s advanced notice of proposed rulemaking a “significant 
motivating factor” in the efforts to secure the enactment of DSHEA).  
 171.  The Tan Sheet, Dietary Supplement Blackout Day to Support Hatch/Richardson Bills, 
PHARMA & MEDTECH BUS. INTELLIGENCE (Aug. 9, 1993), 
https://www.pharmamedtechbi.com/publications/the-tan-sheet/01/024/dietary-supplement-
blackout-day-to-support-hatchrichardson-bills.  The Blackout Day campaign’s slogan was “Don’t 
Let Health Freedom Follow the Dinosaur.”  Id.  
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represented the bill as protection for patient autonomy and consumer 
choice.172 
The lobbying efforts paid off.  Passed unanimously by Congress173 and 
signed into law by President Clinton, DSHEA classified dietary 
supplements as food rather than drugs or food additives under the FDCA174 
and established a special regulatory framework for dietary supplements that 
limited the FDA’s ability to regulate them.175  Congress enacted DSHEA 
for a number of reasons, but namely because it thought the FDA had 
erected “unreasonable regulatory barriers”176 that could prevent consumers 
from receiving dietary supplements—products that were widely used, 
generally safe, and available at a lower cost than traditional medicines.177  
DSHEA was meant to rectify the FDA’s inadequate, “ad hoc, patchwork 
regulatory policy”178  and “bring common sense to the treatment of dietary 
supplements under regulation and law.”179  With the enactment of DSHEA, 
Congress ultimately foreclosed much of the FDA’s power in dietary 
supplement regulation.180 
3.  DSHEA’s Negative Impact on Dietary Supplement Regulation 
and Public Health and Safety 
DSHEA drastically changed the regulation of dietary supplements and 
has since been labeled “the most important example of deregulation of a 
federal health and safety program.”181  Dietary supplements are now treated 
as a category of food, and thus do not undergo agency scrutiny before they 
are marketed directly to the consumer.182  Only “new dietary ingredients,” 
                                                          
 172.  See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2, 
108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.) (“[C]onsumers should be 
empowered to make choices about preventive health care programs based on data from scientific 
studies of health benefits related to particular dietary supplements.”). 
 173.  Hill, supra note 163, at 371. 
 174.  See DSHEA § 3 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff)) (“[A] dietary supplement shall be 
deemed to be a food within the meaning of this [Act].”). 
 175.  See DSHEA § 4 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 342) (adding new standards for determining 
whether a supplement is adulterated and placing the burden of proof on the FDA to show that a 
supplement is adulterated). 
 176.  DSHEA § 2 (legislative findings). 
 177.  Id.  At that time, almost fifty percent of Americans regularly used dietary supplements 
for nutrition purposes.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  William J. Clinton, President, Statement upon Signing S. 784 (Oct. 25, 1994), reprinted 
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 3523-1. 
 180.  See Hill, supra note 163, at 363 (charging DSHEA with failing to provide the FDA with 
adequate regulatory power to protect consumers).  
 181.  Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 85. 
 182.  See 21 U.S.C. § 321(ff) (2012) (defining dietary supplements as “food” within the 
meaning of the statute); see also David Kessler, Cancer and Herbs, 342 N. ENG. J. MED. 1742, 
1742–43 (2000) (discussing how supplements are regulated under the DSHEA). 
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dietary supplement ingredients not marketed prior to October 15, 1994, 
need FDA approval—all other ingredients were grandfathered in by 
DSHEA.183  Supplements sold before 1994 may only be regulated if the 
FDA can prove that they are adulterated and present an “unreasonable risk 
of illness or injury.”184  If the FDA desires to remove a product from the 
market, it must prove that the product is an “imminent hazard to public 
health or safety,” a process that requires the FDA to use its limited 
resources to conduct testing and studies on a supplement.185 
Since its enactment DSHEA has faced criticism from academics and 
medical professionals who claim that the Act’s regulatory framework leaves 
the public vulnerable to dangerous dietary supplements.186  Many scholars 
call for DSHEA’s repeal or amendment because it placed the FDA in a 
reactive role, led to an increase of drug-like products posing as dietary 
supplements, and made it difficult for the FDA to remove dangerous 
supplements from the market.187 
Much of the criticism is directed at the fact that the FDA now has a 
purely reactive role and can only act after it has found proof that substantial 
                                                          
 183.  21 U.S.C. § 350b(d) (2012). 
 184.  21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (2012).  
 185.  Id.; see also Richard Potomac, Are You Sure You Want to Eat That?: U.S. Government 
and Private Regulation of Domestically Produced and Marketed Dietary Supplements, 23 LOY. 
CONSUMER L. REV. 54, 66 (2010) (noting that initiating a ban of a dietary supplement is 
impractical for the FDA because it is “incredibly onerous, expensive, and time-consuming”); Hill, 
supra note 163, at 381–84 (describing the FDA’s long, arduous effort to ban ephedra from the 
dietary supplement market). 
 186.  See, e.g., Interview by Ira Flatow, NPR, with Paul Offit, Chief of the Division of 
Infectious Diseases, Children’s Hospital in Philadelphia (July 5, 2013), available at 
http://www.npr.org/2013/07/05/199025493/is-alternative-medicine-really-medicine (“[DSHEA] is 
an education act that has nothing to do with education and everything to do with the consumer not 
knowing what they’re buying because the industry is now allowed to, frankly, sell products under 
this wink and nod . . . .”); Letter from Michael D. Maves, Am. Medical Ass’n, to Sen. Richard J. 
Durbin (Feb. 17, 2004), reprinted in 10 Years After the Implementation of DSHEA: The Status of 
Dietary Supplements in the United States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and 
Wellness of the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 108th Cong. 30 (2004) (stating that the American 
Medical Association believes that DSHEA fails to give the FDA “adequate regulatory oversight” 
of dietary supplements and supports amendments to the statute). 
 187.  See, e.g., Peter J. Cohen, Science, Politics, and the Regulation of Dietary Supplements: 
It’s Time to Repeal DSHEA, 31 AM. J.L. & MED. 175, 181 (2005) (“DSHEA gutted much of what 
had been accepted as integral to the states’ protection of consumers.”); Potomac, supra note 185, 
at 55 (claiming the current dietary supplement regulatory framework puts the public in 
“substantial risk”); Hill, supra note 163, at 364 (joining other academics in arguing that DSHEA 
needs to be amended in order to protect consumers).  But see Lars Noah & Barbara A. Noah, A 
Drug by Any Other Name . . . ?: Paradoxes in Dietary Supplement Risk Regulation, 17 STAN. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 165, 167–68 (2006) (arguing that DSHEA grants the FDA adequate “regulatory 
muscle” to implement “aggressive” risk-management and needs not be repealed); Joshua H. 
Beisler, Note, Dietary Supplements and Their Discontents: FDA Regulation and the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 511, 512–13 (2000) (arguing that 
DSHEA plays an important role in maintaining consumer access to dietary supplements). 
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harm has occurred.188  David Kessler, former FDA Commissioner, agrees 
that DSHEA is inadequate: 
 The safety standard may sound as if the FDA has all the 
authority it needs to protect the public.  The problem is that the 
burden of proof lies with the FDA.  Even when the agency is able 
to act, how is it supposed to know which products contain 
[harmful substances], and who sells them?189 
After the passage of DSHEA, the number of available dietary 
supplements increased dramatically, from 4000 to 55,000 in 2012, making 
it even more difficult for the FDA to keep tabs on the changing industry.190  
Exempt from providing the initial information required of their 
pharmaceutical counterparts, dietary supplement manufacturers and their 
products are relatively unknown entities until an adverse event or other red 
flag garners FDA attention.191  For example, before it was voluntarily 
recalled in 2009, the weight-loss supplement Hydroxycut was linked to one 
death and twenty-three instances of liver failure.192  Neither the FDA nor 
the millions of consumers who used Hydroxycut had any way to determine 
the safety of the product beforehand because DSHEA so limited the FDA’s 
role in overseeing dietary supplements.193  Without a reliable source 
ensuring a product’s integrity, consumers cannot be sure dietary 
                                                          
 188.  See, e.g., Richard E. Nowak, DSHEA’s Failure: Why a Proactive Approach to Dietary 
Supplement Regulation Is Needed to Effectively Protect Consumers, Comment, 2010 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1045, 1068, 1076 (2010) (critiquing the FDA’s “limited, reactive authority” to regulate 
dietary supplements under DSHEA and recommending a proactive approach modeled after the 
European Union’s Food Supplement Directive).  
 189.  Kessler, supra note 182, at 1743; see also Potomac, supra note 185, at 65 (echoing the 
claim that the FDA lacks knowledge about what supplements are being produced, which is a 
major barrier to effective regulation under DSHEA). 
 190.  Pieter A. Cohen, Assessing Supplement Safety—The FDA’s Controversial Proposal, 366 
N. ENG. J. MED. 389, 389 (2012); see also Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act: Is the 
FDA Trying to Change the Intent of Congress?: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Gov’t Reform, 
106th Cong. 17 (1999) (statement of Jane Henney, Comm’r., FDA), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/gro/hgo57333.000/hgo57333_0f.htm (commenting on the 
significant changes in the dietary supplement industry since the passage of the DSHEA). 
 191.  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 118 (stating that the “important problem with 
supplements is the unknown”).  
 192.  Nowak, supra note 188, at 1048. 
 193.  Id.  A more recent example of an unsafe ingredient being marketed as a “natural” dietary 
supplement is DMAA (also known as dimethylamylamine, methylhexanamine or geranium 
extract).  Consumer Updates: Stimulant Potentially Dangerous to Consumers, FDA Warns, U.S. 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Apr. 11, 2013), 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm347270.htm.  The ingredient is illegal 
to include in dietary supplements and has been linked to causing heart attacks and death.  Id.  In an 
effort to get DMAA out of the marketplace, the FDA issued warning letters to manufacturers 
whose products contained DMAA.  Id. 
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supplements are what they claim to be, and the FDA is unable to act until a 
serious problem occurs.194 
DSHEA also incentivized manufacturers to market their products as 
dietary supplements in order to take advantage of the Act’s relaxed 
restrictions.195  Manufacturers of products that previously were not 
considered food supplements can now take advantage of DSHEA’s broad 
definition of dietary supplement and make claims about the structure of the 
body as long as the label includes a disclaimer.196  Products with no 
nutritive value that use the same ingredients as pharmaceuticals are slipping 
under the regulatory radar by posing as dietary supplements.197  In a hearing 
before Congress, former FDA Commissioner Jane E. Henney testified: 
“[P]roducts that contain substances similar to those found in prescription 
drugs are marketed for children as dietary supplements.  Likewise, products 
with ingredients that simulate illicit street drugs are marketed as dietary 
supplements to adolescents . . . .”198  Because DSHEA uses such broad 
definitions, many substances that would otherwise be regulated are being 
marketed to consumers with little to no agency oversight.199 
The FDA also faces difficulties in identifying the cause of problems 
linked to dietary supplements because supplement use takes place outside 
of a health care setting.200  In its initial enactment, DSHEA did not require 
supplement manufacturers to report adverse events to the FDA, a feature 
that garnered much criticism.201  Even though Congress enacted legislation 
in 2006 requiring supplement manufacturers to report serious adverse 
                                                          
 194.  See Interview by Ira Flatow, NPR, with Paul Offit, supra note 186 (expressing concerns 
about trusting even low-risk supplements “because this is an unregulated industry, [and] you don’t 
know what’s in that bottle”). 
 195.  See Hill, supra note 163, at 378–79 (noting that DSHEA has given manufacturers 
leverage to negotiate with the FDA in order to get borderline products, such as cholesterol-
lowering margarine, admitted as a dietary supplement, rather than a food additive).  
 196.  Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 95.  Specifically the supplement’s label must state: “This 
statement has not been evaluated by the Food and Drug Administration.  This product is not 
intended to diagnose, treat, cure, or prevent any disease.”  21 U.S.C. § 343(r)(6)(C) (2012).  If an 
ingredient is new, the FDA will require a manufacturer to provide “reasonable assurance that such 
ingredient does not present a significant or unreasonable risk of illness or injury” before it allows 
the supplement to be marketed.  21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1)(B). 
 197.  See Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 95–96, 117–18.  
 198.  Statement of Jane Henney, supra note 190. 
 199.  See Hill, supra note 163, at 373–74 (discussing the ambiguity of the definition of the 
catch-all term “dietary substance,” which allows items such as shark cartilage to be marketed 
under DSHEA even though they do not otherwise “supplement the diet”). 
 200.  See Kessler, supra note 182, at 1743 (remarking that the difficulty in pinpointing adverse 
effects is exacerbated in the supplement context).  
 201.  See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 201, at 184 (noting a report from the Institute of Medicine 
that found that “the lack of adverse event reporting” hindered the FDA’s ability to “monitor 
supplement safety”); Hill, supra note 163, at 393 (recommending mandatory adverse event 
reporting for dietary supplement manufacturers).  
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events to the FDA,202 the FDA estimates it receives reports on only two 
percent of adverse events related to dietary supplements.203 
Even when the FDA learns of adverse events, the proof required by the 
statutory scheme is a major obstacle to enforcement action, a feature which 
jeopardizes public health.204  The FDA’s decade-long struggle to ban the 
use of ephedra, a substance used in dietary supplements linked to numerous 
deaths and over 1600 reported adverse events, has become symbolic of the 
FDA’s relative impotence to effectively protect the public under DSHEA’s 
scheme.205  Years of testing, reports, litigation, and state-issued bans 
preceded the final enforceable FDA ban of the product.206  It continues to be 
difficult, time-consuming, and costly for the FDA to prove that a dietary 
supplement is adulterated or poses an “imminent hazard” to public 
health.207  Furthermore, the FDA does not have the resources to enforce 
compliance with even the limited requirements placed on supplement 
manufacturers, and many companies decide to risk being investigated rather 
than comply with regulations.208  The statutory standard for marketplace 
removal has been labeled as merely “cautionary language” that gives the 
FDA no real power to enforce compliance with good manufacturing 
practices.209 
II.  ANALYSIS 
DSHEA removed much of the FDA’s regulatory power over dietary 
supplements at a time when supplement use was increasing and replaced the 
                                                          
 202.  See Dietary Supplement and Nonprescription Drug Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
109-462, § 760 (a)(3), 120 Stat. 3469 (2006) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 379aa-1(2) 
(2012)) (defining a “serious adverse event” as one that results in death, a life-threatening 
experience, inpatient hospitalization, significant disability or incapacity, or a birth defect).   
 203.  Potomac, supra note 185, at 91.  Furthermore, dietary supplement companies do not have 
to report mild or moderate adverse events or side effects, depriving the FDA of an important set of 
information.  Id. at 66. 
 204.  See Cohen, supra note 201, at 189 (noting that DSHEA’s enforcement requirements 
make criminal prosecutions under the statute rare). 
 205.  See, e.g., id. at 190 (claiming that the “history of the ban on ephedra . . . illustrates 
significant enforcement impediments inherent in DSHEA”); Potomac, supra note 185, at 60 
(using the FDA’s struggle to ban ephedra despite “overwhelming evidence” of its dangers as an 
example of the difficulties of banning a supplement from the market). 
 206.  See Hill, supra note 163, at 381–84 (discussing the events leading up to the FDA’s ban of 
ephedra).  
 207.  See 21 U.S.C. § 342(f)(1) (providing the statutory standard to remove dietary supplement 
ingredients from the market); Potomac, supra note 185, at 60 (noting that the FDA has developed 
other methods to police the supplement industry since instituting a ban of a product is so difficult).  
 208.  Potomac, supra note 185, at 92 (estimating that as few as eighteen percent of dietary 
supplement companies are in compliance with FDA regulations). 
 209.  Nowak, supra note 188, at 1067. 
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FDA’s system with a weak regulatory scheme.210  This congressional 
preemption led to growth in the dietary supplements industry,211 but also an 
increase in adverse events linked to supplement use212 and a federal agency 
which is almost powerless to remove harmful products from the market.213  
Steps must be taken to prevent a similar result in the mobile health app 
context. 
There are several similarities between dietary supplements and mobile 
health apps and the FDA’s struggle to effectively regulate both.214  Because 
of these similarities the FDA and Congress can learn important lessons 
from DSHEA that can be applied to the current efforts to regulate 
MMAs.215  First, Congress should not significantly narrow the FDA’s 
authority over medical devices in a way that leaves the agency powerless to 
adjust to changes in the MMA industry.216 
Second, instead of using legislation to prematurely limit FDA 
regulation of dietary supplements in a DSHEA-like fashion, Congress 
should create a new FDA sub-agency, the Office of mHealth, which can 
direct the FDA’s mobile health efforts.217  The Office of mHealth could be 
modeled off of similar sub-agencies and committees, including one created 
by DSHEA,218 but it also must focus on acquiring personnel with expertise 
in mobile technologies in order to be truly effective.219  The new Office of 
mHealth would address Congress’s concerns about mobile health app 
regulation and enable the FDA to provide confident, flexible oversight to 
the growing mobile health app industry.220 
                                                          
 210.  See supra note 175; Regulation of Dietary Supplements, 58 Fed. Reg. at 33,690 
(discussing the state of the dietary supplement industry in 1993); see also Kessler, supra note 182, 
at 1743 (explaining flaws in DSHEA’s regulatory scheme).  
 211.  Gilhooley, supra note 18, at 85 (attributing the expansion of the dietary supplement 
market to DSHEA). 
 212.  See Potomac, supra note 185, at 91 (pointing out the rise in supplement-related illnesses 
and death).  There were four reported supplement-caused deaths in 1994 and twenty-seven 
recorded deaths in 2005.  Id.  
 213.  See id. at 93 (blaming DSHEA’s regulatory scheme for allowing harmful substances to 
remain on the market while federal agencies are unable to adequately police them).  
 214.  See infra Part II.A. 
 215.  See infra Part II.A. 
 216.  See infra Part II.B.  
 217.  See infra Part II.C. 
 218.  See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13, 
108 Stat. 4325 (creating the Office of Dietary Supplements within the National Institute of 
Health).   
 219.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 220.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
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A.  The DSHEA Saga Is Relevant to the Regulation of Mobile Health 
Apps Because of Similarities Between Dietary Supplements and 
Mobile Health Apps 
Because dietary supplements and mobile health apps possess 
analogous features, it seems that Congress may be building up to another 
DSHEA-like statute, and thus similar consequences could result.  First, the 
dietary supplement industry shares many features with the mobile health 
app industry.  Both are multi-billion dollar industries221 with powerful 
lobbying presences in Washington, making it more likely that Congress will 
want to appease the industry and keep regulatory barriers to a minimum.222  
Both involve products that can be marketed directly to and used by 
consumers without any professional guidance, thus presenting unique risks 
to consumers.223  Lastly, both supplements and mobile health apps offer 
alternatives to the conventional health care model.224  Many dietary 
supplements and mobile health apps present little to no risk to users, 
making it easier for opponents of regulation to ignore the risks created by 
the minority of supplements and apps that could cause serious harm in 
certain circumstances.225  Many of these shared characteristics, such as 
                                                          
 221.  More than 100 million Americans collectively spend more than $35 billion on dietary 
supplements.  Press Release, Senator Orrin Hatch, Hatch Marks 20th Anniversary of the Dietary 
Supplement Health and Education Act (DSHEA) (Oct. 27, 2014), 
http://www.hatch.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2014/10/hatch-marks-20th-anniversary-of-the-
dietary-supplement-health-and-education-act-dshea.  The mobile health app market is expected to 
exceed $26 billion by 2017.  Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act 
of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014). 
 222.  See Ashley Gold, Tech Giants Move to Protect Wearables, POLITICO (Sept. 24, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/health-applications-wearables-congress-111299.html 
(discussing the lobbying activities of tech companies concerned with regulation of wearable health 
technology).  Large corporations, such as IBM and Athena Health, support the passage of the 
PROTECT Act. Press Release, Senator Angus King, King, Fischer Introduce Legislation to 
Protect Jobs, Prevent Overregulation in Growing Health IT Industry (Feb. 10, 2014), 
http://www.king.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/king-fischer-introduce-legislation-to-
protect-jobs-prevent-overregulation-in-growing-health-it-industry. 
 223.  Compare Noah & Noah, supra note 187, at 193 (noting that dietary supplements present 
“serious risks” because they are typically used without physician supervision or “the ameliorating 
influence of expert oversight”), with Dayton, supra note 6, at 721–22, and Krouse, supra note 1, 
at 745 (both discussing the risks of unsupervised consumer use of mobile health apps).  
 224.  See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1197–99 (exploring the potentials for mobile health 
technology and its ability to “democratize” medicine); Beisler, supra note 187, at 511–12 
(grouping dietary supplements in the same category as other “alternative” medicines).  
 225.  See Noah & Noah, supra note 187, at 173–74 (comparing the low risk of daily 
multivitamins to the serious risk presented by products containing substances such as kava, 
ephedra, and L-tryptophan).  Similarly, a medical flashcard app would present little health risk to 
a user, whereas an app that controlled the functions or settings of an infusion pump could present 
serious risks to a patient were it to malfunction.  See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra 
note 1, at 20, 29 (categorizing the mentioned apps in different categories because of their different 
levels of risk); see also Paul Brown, Gov’t Relations Manager, Nat’l Res. Center for Health 
Research, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health 
Information Technology 99 (May 13, 2014), available at 
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widespread use, relative safety, and the potential to offer alternatives to 
traditional medicine, are significant because they were cited in DSHEA’s 
legislative findings as motivation for the Act and could similarly be used to 
support restrictive mobile health app legislation.226 
Second, even though the FDA has proposed modest oversight of 
MMAs, there have already been signs of pushback from the mobile health 
industry and Congress, similar to the backlash seen in the dietary 
supplement context.227  Just as the FDA’s regulation of supplements 
fluctuated throughout the twentieth century leading Congress to refer to it 
as an “ad hoc, patchwork regulatory policy,”228 the FDA’s attempt at 
regulating software enabled devices, the precursors to mobile health apps, 
has also been inconsistent and uncertain.229  This type of agency instability 
provides more reason for stakeholders to petition Congress to intervene.230  
Now the proposed PROTECT Act, SOFTWARE Act, and MEDTECH Act 
are attempting to place strict boundaries on what types of software the FDA 
can regulate.231  Again, as in DSHEA, these bills’ supporters appeal to 
“common sense” and the ways that apps have affected consumers.232  
Moreover, the number of mobile health apps has already surpassed the 
number of dietary supplements on the market233 and has the potential to be 
                                                          
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (noting that even though the MMA Guidance characterized the risk of mobile health apps as 
“generally low” “doesn’t mean they are all low”). 
 226.  Compare Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 
2(10), (12)(A), 108 Stat. 4325 (mentioning increased consumer reliance on nontraditional 
healthcare and the dietary supplements industry’s “integral” place in the economy), with 
Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. 
§ 2(a) (2014)  (commenting similarly on the expansion of mobile health apps and their 
transformative potential).   
 227.  See supra notes 170–180 and accompanying text; Cortez, supra note 43, at 1216–17 
(commenting that the FDA has been “upbraided by skeptical members of Congress for daring to 
regulate [medical apps]”).  Senator Orrin Hatch, one of the authors of DSHEA, also introduced the 
MEDTECH Act.  Bowman, supra note 134. 
 228.  DSHEA § 2. 
 229.  Cortez, supra note 43, at 1220–23 (describing the beginning and eventual demise of the 
FDA’s Draft Software Policy and ultimately concluding that “[s]oftware does not stand on terra 
firma with the FDA”).  Furthermore, the FDA has already made changes in its MMA regulatory 
approach since the release of the MMA Guidance.  See supra notes 118–122 and accompanying 
text. 
 230.  See, e.g., Letter from Access Integrity, supra note 30, at 1 (asking Congress to provide 
statutory clarity for mobile health regulation).  
 231.  See supra Part I.A.3.  
 232.  Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“We believe Congress must act and codify the common 
sense that you can’t regulate new technology with old rules.”).   
 233.  There are now over 100,000 available mobile health apps, RESEARCH2GUIDANCE, supra 
note 2, at 7, and approximately 55,000 different dietary supplements as of 2013, Dietary 
Supplement Label Database (DSLD), NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS, http://ods.od.nih.gov/Research/Dietary_Supplement_Label_Database.aspx (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
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more transformative to health care.234  For these reasons, the pressure on 
Congress to promote innovation and consumer access to mobile health apps 
will likely be as strong as it was prior to the enactment of DSHEA.235 
Overall, these similarities demonstrate that it is very possible that 
Congress could again preempt the FDA as it did with DSHEA and that the 
negative effects of DSHEA could forecast the possible negative impact a 
similar mobile health app bill could have on both the FDA and public 
health.236 
B.  Congress Should Not Apply DSHEA-like Preemption to the FDA’s 
Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps 
The failures of DSHEA discussed in Part I.B. demonstrate that 
Congress should not preempt FDA authority in a dynamic, consumer-
focused industry.237  Furthermore, mobile health apps are still an evolving 
technology, making them ill-suited to be defined or confined by concrete 
legislation.238  Lastly, unlike its earlier approach to dietary supplements, the 
FDA’s current cooperative, risk-based approach to regulating mobile health 
apps closely mirrors that suggested by members of Congress, making the 
proposed amendments to the FDCA unnecessary at this time.239  Thus 
Congress should not use legislation to limit the FDA’s authority in the 
MMA context.240 
                                                          
 234.  Cf. Terry, supra note 5, at 751–56 (explaining how mobile health apps have the potential 
to disrupt healthcare in ways that other consumer health products do not).  
 235.  Cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (recognizing that momentum for congressional 
legislation in the mobile health app field is building). 
 236.  Although the proposed HIT-related bills differ from DSHEA, the idea behind the bills 
and DSHEA is the same: Congress thinks it can improve the FDA’s regulatory framework and 
wants to decrease the FDA’s impact on the field.  Compare Dietary Supplement Health and 
Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 2(15)(B), 108 Stat. 4325 (“[A] rational Federal 
framework must be established to supersede the current ad hoc, patchwork regulatory policy on 
dietary supplements.”), with Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act 
of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. § 2(a)(5) (2014) (“Consumers and innovators need a new risk-
based framework . . . that improves on the framework of the Food and Drug Administration.”).  
 237.  See supra Part I.B.3. 
 238.  See Bakul Patel, Senior Policy Advisor to the Director of the CDRH, Remarks at Public 
Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 74 
(May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (expressing the problem with drawing a “concrete” line to define different types of HIT and 
suggesting a more flexible approach to adapt to the “continuous learning environment”).  
 239.  Compare FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 29 (recommending a narrowly-
tailored, risk-based health IT regulatory framework based on input from stakeholders), with 
Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 113th Cong. 
§ 2(b)(2) (calling for risk-based approach to regulating software that decreases regulatory burdens 
and fosters innovation).   
 240.  See supra notes 137–141 and accompanying text (explaining how the proposed acts 
would remove different types of software from the FDA’s jurisdiction under the FDCA). 
 952 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 74:921 
As DSHEA demonstrates, when Congress interferes with agency 
discretion it can prevent the FDA from being the protective body it was 
designed to be.241  The FDA is frequently criticized for taking a reactive 
rather than a proactive role—for responding to health disasters rather than 
preventing them.242  Proposed legislation, such as the PROTECT Act and 
SOFTWARE Act, however, go even further than DSHEA, and instead of 
placing the FDA in a reactive role, they completely remove certain classes 
of mobile health apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction.243  This interference 
could create problems.  For example, removing clinical decision support 
apps from the FDA’s jurisdiction would create a huge risk to patients244 and 
“would provide scant oversight to products that might evolve into some of 
the more innovative and important mHealth products in the near future.”245  
Furthermore, by broadly defining certain types of software and placing it 
beyond the FDA’s reach, Congress may incentivize app developers to 
erroneously claim their high-risk apps fall under one of the unregulated 
categories, just as DSHEA did with supplement manufacturers.246  
Congressional legislation that delays FDA regulation or enforcement could 
lead to consumer mistrust of mobile health apps or even injury caused by a 
faulty app.247 
Moreover, the novelty of mobile health applications makes it even 
more imperative that the FDA’s authority over MMAs not fall under a 
premature, DSHEA-like statute.248  Unlike dietary supplements, with which 
                                                          
 241.  See supra notes 187–189 and accompanying text (explaining how DSHEA placed the 
FDA in a reactive role).  
 242.  See, e.g., Cortez, supra note 43, at 1218–20 (critiquing the FDA’s restrained treatment of 
software in the past).  Professor Cortez gives the example of the first software-enabled radiation 
machine, the Therac-25, a device that was recalled after it literally burned through patients’ bodies 
with radiation overdoses.  Not until after this tragedy occurred did the FDA begin to develop a 
separate policy for regulating software.  Id. 
 243.  See, e.g., PROTECT Act § 3 (removing all clinical and health software from regulation 
under the FDCA). 
 244.  MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66, at 1–3 (discussing 
possible risks presented by CDS apps).  
 245.  Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376.  Cortez et al. give examples of CDS apps such as 
symptom checkers and drug dose calculators and state that “it is crucial that the algorithms are 
safe and work as intended—the twin goals of FDA oversight.”  Id. 
 246.  See supra notes 195–199 and accompanying text (commenting on the tendency of 
manufacturers to market their products as dietary supplements to escape harsher regulations even 
though the products may be more similar to pharmaceuticals). 
 247.  See Robert Jarrin, Qualcomm, Inc., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based 
Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 99 (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (claiming that patients are exposed to safety risks while the government and stakeholders 
experiment with standards and regulations for mobile health technologies).   
 248.  See Statement of Jeffrey Shuren, supra note 27, at 22–23 (testifying that legislation 
regarding mobile health apps is “premature” and would risk “lock[ing]” regulation into a new, 
untested framework); cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376 (“If Congress passes legislation, it 
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the FDA and consumers were already somewhat familiar, mobile health app 
technology is relatively new and the market itself is evolving rapidly.249  
Professor Nathan Cortez warns that fixed statutory definitions that anchor 
the FDA’s jurisdiction to software as it now exists could cause problems in 
the future as mHealth continues to develop.250  Congress should give the 
FDA time to effectively implement its proposed strategy, especially since 
the FDA has manifested an intention to work with stakeholders.251  The 
FDA can respond to changes in app technology and consumer use of 
MMAs more readily than Congress could if the statutory definitions proved 
to be inadequate.252  The pervasiveness of mobile technology and general 
uncertainty over where this industry is heading should give Congress pause 
before it paralyzes one of the key federal agencies charged with assuring 
public health and safety.253 
Lastly, it is simply unnecessary for Congress to exercise its preemptive 
prerogative at this time because the FDA is taking a limited regulatory 
approach to MMAs that aligns with that envisioned by Congress—
something it did not do with dietary supplements in the 1990s.254  When 
enacting DSHEA, the Senate noted that the FDA “twist[ed] the statute” and 
“distort[ed] the law” in efforts to prevent the marketing and sale of certain 
supplements.255  Here however, the FDA has not manipulated the definition 
of “device” under the FDCA in an analogous way in order to pull mobile 
health apps under its jurisdiction.256  Furthermore, the FDA has already 
stated in the MMA Guidance that it will not regulate or enforce regulations 
against some of the types of apps, such as electronic health records, that the 
PROTECT Act and MEDTECH Act wish to officially remove from its 
                                                          
should update the FDA’s authority to better fit mHealth and preserve the FDA’s discretion to 
address emerging risks.”). 
 249.  See supra Part I.A.1; see generally Cortez, supra note 43 (examining the technological 
revolution of mobile health apps and the challenges they present to regulation).  
 250.  Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 376. 
 251.  FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 29; see also Cortez, supra note 71, at 213–
14 (remarking on the “collaborative mood” exhibited by the FDA at its HIT public workshops).  
 252.  Cf. Tim Wu, Agency Threats, 60 DUKE L.J. 1841, 1848–50 (2011) (arguing that 
lawmaking in a dynamic, uncertain industry can be premature and cripple future innovation).  
 253.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372 (arguing that the FDA’s oversight of mobile health 
technology is “increasingly important”).  
 254.  See supra Part I.A.2 (outlining the FDA’s proposed limited framework for regulating 
mobile health apps). 
 255.  S. REP. NO. 103-410, at 16, 22 (1994) (“[T]he FDA has disregarded the congressional 
intent underlying the law regulating food and food additives.”).  
 256.  For instance, the FDA could have attempted to regulate the sale of mobile platforms, 
such as smartphones, by saying that the addition of a mobile health app turned them into medical 
devices; instead, the FDA has taken a narrow view by only regulating a small portion of the apps 
themselves.  MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 12–13. 
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jurisdiction.257  Since congressional interference is not necessary at this 
time, Congress should not enact statutes, such as the proposed PROTECT 
Act, that interfere with the types of software and apps that fall under the 
FDA’s jurisdiction.258  To do so would risk the serious consequences which 
followed DSHEA’s preemption of FDA authority over dietary 
supplements.259 
C.  Alternative to Premature Preemption by Congress: Create an 
Expert Sub-Agency on Mobile Health Apps 
Although this Comment argues that DSHEA provides examples of 
what Congress should not do in its quest to promote mHealth innovation, 
DSHEA does offer one positive lesson that Congress should pursue as an 
alternative to preemption.  Instead of creating new statutory definitions that 
unnecessarily limit the FDA’s discretion in an unfamiliar industry, 
Congress should create an expert sub-agency within the FDA—the Office 
of mHealth.260  The Office of mHealth can lead the agency in its efforts to 
regulate MMAs and model itself on other sub-agencies or committees, 
including the Office of Dietary Supplements, created by DSHEA.261  By 
creating an office with the requisite technical expertise, Congress will 
enable the FDA to provide effective, up-to-date regulation suitable to a 
dynamic industry while avoiding the pitfalls of DSHEA.262 
1.  The Office of mHealth 
This Comment is not the first to suggest some sort of department or 
office dedicated to software or mobile health within the FDA.263  In fact, 
                                                          
 257.  Id. at 16 (placing electronic health records in the enforcement discretion category).  
Moreover, the FDA already declared that it will not enforce regulations of MDDS, MDDS 
GUIDANCE, supra note 118, which would fall under the PROTECT Act’s definition of “clinical 
software,” MHEALTH REGULATORY COAL. & CDS COAL., supra note 66.  Likewise, the 
MEDTECH Act proposes removal of administrative software and products intended to be used for 
health and fitness outside of the clinical setting, Medical Electronic Data Technology 
Enhancement for Consumers’ Health Act S. 2977, 113th Cong. § 2 (2014), but the FDA already 
stated that it does not consider these types of software to fall under the mobile medical app 
category and thus will not regulate them, MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 21, 
25.  
 258.  See supra notes 142–144 and accompanying text.  
 259.  See supra Part I.B.3.  
 260.  Cf. Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13, 
108 Stat. 4325 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 287c-11 (2012)) (creating the Office of Dietary 
Supplements).  The Office of mHealth could perhaps be under the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health (“CDRH”), which currently manages MMA regulation. See generally MMA 
GUIDANCE, supra note 1.   
 261.  See infra Part II.C.1. 
 262.  See infra Part II.C.2. 
 263.  See, e.g., FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 14–15 (proposing the creation of a 
Health IT Safety Center); Scott D. Danzis and Christopher Pruitt, Rethinking the FDA’s 
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Representative Michael Honda suggested the creation of an Office of 
Wireless Health Technology within the FDA in his bill, the Healthcare 
Innovation and Marketplace Technologies Act.264  Although the bill died in 
committee, Representative Honda insisted that the funding, interest, and 
need for such an office exists.265  Currently, the FDA has no sub-agency or 
office dedicated to mHealth or software, so looking at the structures, 
missions, successes, and failures of similar offices in other federal agencies 
can provide a guide for the formation of an expert sub-agency for mHealth 
within the FDA.266  The Office of Dietary Supplements, a sub-agency 
within the National Institute of Health (“NIH”),267 and the Federal Trade 
Commission’s (“FTC”) Mobile Technology Unit, can be used as guidelines 
for the establishment of the FDA’s Office of mHealth.268 
a.  Office of Dietary Supplements 
The Office of Dietary Supplements (“O.D.S.”), created by DSHEA, 
provides a better model than the rest of the Act’s provisions for the 
successful congressional treatment of a growing or unfamiliar industry.269  
According to DSHEA, the purposes of the O.D.S. were to (1) “explore 
more fully the potential role of dietary supplements” in improving health 
care and (2) “promote scientific study of the benefits of dietary supplements 
in maintaining health and preventing chronic disease and other health-
                                                          
Regulation of Mobile Medical Apps, 9 SCITECH LAWYER 4 (2013) (proposing that the FDA 
should have an Office of Software, similar to the Office of In Vitro Diagnostics, allowing the 
FDA to grow its expertise in the area of mobile medical apps); Email from Bradley Merril 
Thompson, Counsel to MRC, to Bakul Patel, Senior Policy Advisor to the Director of the CDRH, 
10 (Oct. 19, 2011), available at http://mhealthregulatorycoalition.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/06/MRC-Comments-on-FDA-Draft-MMA-Guidance.pdf (suggesting the 
creation of a mHealth-specific Regulatory Division within the FDA).  
 264.   Health Care and Innovation and Marketplace Techs. Act of 2013, H.R. 2363, 113th 
Cong. § 1 (2013).  The bill died in committee.  H.R. 2363 (113th): Health Care Innovation and 
Marketplace Technologies Act of 2013, GOVTRACK.US, 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr2363 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).  
 265.  See Timothy Hay, Q&A: Rep Mike Honda on Proposed Office of Wireless Health, 
VENTURE CAPITAL DISPATCH (Feb. 6, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/venturecapital/2013/02/06/qa-
rep-mike-honda-on-proposed-fda-office-of-wireless-health/ (“There is money, and there should be 
the will.  My job is to create that political will.  This could create jobs, and help innovators.”).  
 266.  Consumer Updates: FDA 101: Advisory Committees, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/ConsumerUpdates/ucm048040.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2015).  
The FDA has approximately fifty federal advisory committees or panels that it uses to obtain 
expert advice, but there is no committee established to work solely on issues of mobile health.  Id.   
 267.  See infra Part II.C.1.a. 
 268.  See infra Part II.C.1.b. 
 269.  See Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-417, § 13, 
108 Stat. 4325 (statutory provisions for O.D.S.); see also Office of Dietary Supplements (ODS), 
NIH DIVISION OF NUTRITION RESEARCH COORDINATION, 
http://dnrc.nih.gov/reports/programs/ods.asp (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (providing an overview of 
the O.D.S.). 
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related conditions.”270  The Office of mHealth should adopt this research-
oriented mission, especially since the full potential of mobile health apps 
has not yet been fulfilled.271  To capitalize on the benefits that mobile health 
apps could provide in the professional medical setting, doctors and other 
professionals will need to know that the products are safe and legitimate, 
just as they do with prescription pharmaceuticals.272 
The Office of mHealth could also adopt the duties of the O.D.S.  The 
O.D.S. Director’s duties include conducting scientific research relating to 
supplements, collecting results from that research, and serving as principal 
advisor to the Secretary of Health and other agency directors on issues 
relating to dietary supplements.273  Because mobile health apps and HIT fall 
under the regulatory jurisdiction of many federal agencies, it would be 
prudent to have a well-informed individual, the Director of the Office of 
mHealth, to serve as an advisor within the FDA and to collaborate with 
other agencies engaged in regulating mHealth and HIT, such as the ONC, 
FCC, and FTC.274  The O.D.S. is made up of fifteen programs, each of 
which interacts with one or more stakeholder communities including 
research investigators, educators, health practitioners, educational 
institutions, food-related industries, consumer and public interest groups, 
and members of the public.275  Similarly, the Office of mHealth should 
create different programs aimed at working with different stakeholders, 
such as patient advocacy groups, health care professionals, app developers, 
mobile technology companies, legal professionals, and consumer interests 
groups.276  This approach would continue the collaborative environment 
already begun by the FDA in the mobile health app context. 
b.  FTC’s Mobile Technology Unit 
The FTC’s Mobile Technology Unit (“M.T.U.”) provides another 
possible model for the Office of mHealth since it was created specifically to 
                                                          
 270.  DSHEA § 13.  
 271.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 372–73 (explaining the transformative potential of 
mobile health apps).  
 272.  See id. at 376 (claiming that without FDA oversight, doctors are put in a “precarious 
position” because they will not know whether they can trust what apps tell them). 
 273.  DSHEA § 13(c). 
 274.  Congress instructed the FDA, FCC, and ONC to work together on a HIT regulatory 
framework.  Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112–
144, § 618, 126 Stat. 993 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 275.  See Budget, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, OFFICE OF DIETARY SUPPLEMENTS, 
http://ods.od.nih.gov/About/Budget.aspx (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (describing the O.D.S. 
programs). 
 276.  The FDASIA Workgroup provides a good representation of the types of stakeholders 
mentioned who could contribute to the Office of mHealth.  For a membership list see FDASIA, 
HEALTHIT.GOV, http://www.healthit.gov/FACAS/health-it-policy-committee/hitpc-
workgroups/fdasia (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
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address mobile technologies.277  Realizing the growing prevalence of 
deceptive practices in the app world, the unit was created to harness the 
technological expertise needed to exercise the FTC’s jurisdiction, an 
approach the FDA should follow.278  In addition to holding public 
workshops and creating educational materials and reports on mobile finance 
issues, the unit acts as a resource for the FTC as it develops policies and 
regulatory guidance that relate to mobile technology.279  Likewise, the 
Office of mHealth should include an educational component to bring 
awareness to the public and the FDA about the risks and benefits of MMAs, 
a goal discussed in the FDASIA Health IT Report.280  The M.T.U. also 
incorporates an enforcement aspect by examining mobile products and 
identifying parties who engage in unfair practices for enforcement action.281  
Because of its lack of personnel and resources, the M.T.U. concentrated on 
filing complaints against highly visible actors, such as Facebook and 
Snapchat, in order to set enforcement precedents for the rest of the app 
                                                          
 277.  The M.T.U. is organized under the Bureau of Consumer Protection’s Financial Practices 
group. Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-financial-practices (last 
visited Feb. 7, 2015). 
 278.  Peter Maass, Your FTC Privacy Watchdogs: Low-Tech, Defensive, Toothless, WIRED 
(June 28, 2012), http://www.wired.com/2012/06/ftc-fail/ (explaining the creation of the M.T.U. to 
oversee the expanding mobile phone sector). 
 279.  See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, MARKETING YOUR MOBILE APP: GET IT RIGHT FROM 
THE START, (2013), available at http://business.ftc.gov/documents/bus81-marketing-your-mobile-
app (providing information to app developers about good privacy and data collection practices); 
FED. TRADE COMM’N, Understanding Mobile Apps, ONGUARDONLINE.GOV (June 2011), 
http://www.onguardonline.gov/articles/0018-understanding-mobile-apps (giving basic information 
to consumers about mobile apps and privacy concerns). 
 280.  FDASIA HEALTH IT REP., supra note 34, at 22–24 (explaining goals to “creat[e] [] an 
environment of learning and continual improvement” in the realm of HIT).  
 281.  Division of Financial Practices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, http://www.ftc.gov/about-
ftc/bureaus-offices/bureau-consumer-protection/our-divisions/division-financial-practices (last 
visited Jan. 8, 2015) (describing the role of the M.T.U.).  Already, the FTC has brought 
enforcement actions against mobile app developers and negotiated settlements with app providers 
such as Google in order to make them establish privacy policies for all mobile services.  FED. 
TRADE COMM’N, PAPER, PLASTIC . . . OR MOBILE?: AN FTC WORKSHOP ON MOBILE PAYMENTS 
2 (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/paper-plastic-or-
mobile-ftc-workshop-mobile-payments/p0124908_mobile_payments_workshop_report_02-28-
13.pdf. 
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industry.282  The Office of mHealth could follow a similar strategy in order 
to maximize its own limited resources.283 
Although the M.T.U.’s aspirations provide a good model for the FDA 
to follow, the reality of the M.T.U. also provides an example of pitfalls to 
avoid—namely, the M.T.U. suffers from a lack of resources and 
experienced personnel.284  For example, the M.T.U. consists merely of six 
people, including only one technologist, which seems very inadequate when 
compared to the type of expertise present in the regulated industry itself.285  
This is exactly the image of impotency that the FDA wants to avoid; 
therefore, the Office of mHealth should include personnel with expertise in 
HIT and app development who can ferret out bad actors.286 
In summary, the Office of mHealth, though similar to the offices 
suggested by the FDASIA Health IT Report and the Healthcare Innovation 
and Marketplace Technologies Act, could also borrow features from 
existing offices, such as the M.T.U. and the O.D.S.  The Office first needs 
to gather expertise in the area of mobile technologies, and then leverage this 
expertise through different enforcement techniques.287  The Office of 
mHealth could be established by legislation, such as Healthcare Innovation 
Marketplace Technologies Act, and would help the mobile health app 
industry navigate the often confusing regulatory process, something that 
would appeal to many regulated parties and members of Congress who 
want to simplify this process.288 
                                                          
 282.  See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Facebook Settles FTC Charges That It 
Deceived Consumers by Failing to Keep Privacy Promises (Nov. 29, 2011), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2011/11/facebook-settles-ftc-charges-it-deceived-
consumers-failing-keep (describing the FTC’s case against Facebook); Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Snapchat Settles FTC Charges That Promises of Disappearing Messages Were False 
(May 8, 2014), http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/05/snapchat-settles-ftc-
charges-promises-disappearing-messages-were (describing the FTC’s case against Snapchat, an 
app that allows the user to send pictures). 
 283.  Cf. Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (explaining that the FDA needs more resources in 
order to keep up with its growing responsibility over MMAs).  
 284.  Maass, supra note 278 (“But the agency’s ambitions are clipped by a lack of both 
funding and legal authority, reflecting a broader uncertainty about the role government should 
play in what is arguably America’s most promising new industry.”). 
 285.  See id. (“For the FTC, the unit represents an important allocation of resources to protect 
the privacy rights of more than 100 million smartphone owners in America.  For Silicon Valley, a 
six-person team is barely a garage startup.”). 
 286.  Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“With potentially thousands of mHealth products 
under the FDA’s domain, agency authority will be undermined if the FDA cannot enforce its 
requirements.  The agency needs additional funding and in-house technical expertise to oversee 
the ongoing flood of mHealth products.”). 
 287.  Id.  
 288.  See Neil Versel, Bill Would Create FDA Office of Mobile Health, HHS Support for App 
Developers, MOBIHEALTHNEWS (Sept. 28, 2012), http://mobihealthnews.com/18580/bill-would-
create-fda-office-of-mobile-health-hhs-support-for-app-developers/ (interviewing an officer of a 
startup health app company who expressed hope that a FDA Office of Mobile Health “could help 
smaller companies like his navigate the ‘confusing’ and often expensive regulatory process”).  
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2.  The Office of mHealth Could Address Barriers to Effective 
Regulation 
The creation of the Office of mHealth could address and overcome 
several critiques of FDA regulation that led some stakeholders and 
members of Congress to be concerned about the agency’s capabilities, 
including the FDA’s lack of expertise in mobile technologies,289 the 
agency’s inability to keep pace with the fast-evolving technological 
sector,290 and the FDA’s inadequate or nonexistent enforcement methods.291 
  
                                                          
 289.  See infra Part II.C.2.a. 
 290.  See infra Part II.C.2.b. 
 291.  See infra Part II.C.2.c. 
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a. Lack of Expertise 
The Office of mHealth could rectify the FDA’s lack of expertise in 
mobile technologies, specifically mobile health apps.292  Although the FDA 
has been regulating medical device software since the 1980s, mobile health 
apps have not been in existence long enough for the agency to have 
acquired sufficient experience with them.293  The shortage of expert 
personnel, or “brain drain” within government agencies is problematic, 
especially for an agency charged with overseeing an innovative field.294  
Without knowledgeable experts sitting on agency review panels and 
evaluating regulatory proposals, the public, Congress, and the courts will 
have little faith in the decisions the agency makes.295 
This shortage of expertise is true for the underfunded and frequently 
criticized FDA.296  Within the FDA’s Center for Devices and Radiological 
Health (“CDRH”), which oversees MMA regulation, reviewer and manager 
turnover is almost twice that of the FDA’s other centers.297  This turnover is 
problematic because as the number of increasingly sophisticated and 
ambitious MMAs grows, so will the need for regulators with mobile app 
experience.298  An understanding of medical devices alone is not enough; 
rather, the FDA needs the input of individuals and organizations with 
knowledge and experience of systems of information technology, mobile 
                                                          
 292.  See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1206 (“FDA is well aware that it lacks technical expertise 
on mobile technologies.”); Hay, supra note 265 (comparing the FDA’s lack of familiarity with 
mobile health technologies to the judiciary’s inexperience during early lawsuits involving 
technology).  
 293.  See MOBILE MEDICAL APP GUIDANCE, supra note 1, at 6 (giving the background of the 
FDA’s history of regulating software). 
 294.  Sidney A. Shapiro, Why Administrative Law Misunderstands How Government Works: 
The Missing Institutional Analysis, 53 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 11 (2013). 
 295.  See id. at 25 (“As politicians and others denigrate the agencies, talented people no longer 
want to work for the government and the government loses expertise.  As the government loses 
expertise, there is less reason for the public to accept its judgments.  And as the public grows more 
distrustful of the agencies, they become less attractive places to work and talented people do not 
want to work there.”).  
 296.  See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 578 n.11 (2009) (documenting reports of the FDA’s 
inability to fulfill its responsibilities due to underfunding and lack of resources and “serious 
scientific deficiencies”).  Peter Barton Hutt, former FDA Chief Counsel, warned, “F.D.A. has 
become a paradigmatic example of the ‘hollow government’ syndrome—an agency with expanded 
responsibilities, stagnant resources, and the consequent inability to implement its statutory 
mandates.”  Peter Barton Hutt, The State of Science at the Food and Drug Administration, 60 
ADMIN. L. REV. 431, 432 (2008). 
 297.  Beth Simone Noveck, If We Only Knew What We Know: Open Regulatory Review at the 
FDA, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 545, 551–52 (2014). 
 298.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (calling for more expertise within the FDA to 
handle mHealth); Noveck, supra note 297, at 553 (“The proliferation of mobile health devices 
such as heart monitors that leverage the sensors in a cellphone has further complicated the 
regulatory process and driven the demand for more knowledgeable and effective regulatory 
review.”). 
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apps, and their application to medicine.299  By creating an office of 
personnel with the requisite technological knowledge to draw from, the 
FDA will no longer be dependent on external advisors or temporary 
workshops like the one formed to make the FDASIA Health IT Report, 
which slows down the regulatory process.300  A more permanent, internal 
entity with actual regulatory authority, such as the Office of mHealth, can 
provide stability and clarity within and without the agency, making further 
congressional intervention unnecessary.301 
b.  Tension Between Fast-paced Innovation and Regulation 
Another objection to FDA regulation of MMAs is that slow-moving 
regulatory processes are obstacles for fast-paced technology, but an Office 
of mHealth can help to mitigate this problem.302  The tension between 
innovation and regulation is a major theme in the literature surrounding 
FDA regulation.303  FDA clearance of medical devices inevitably frustrates 
an app manufacturer’s desire to quickly reach the market before a 
competitor.304  For example, the average clearance time for a mobile 
medical application is 110 days, but this may be preceded by several years 
of discussions.305  One app creator believes that creating an FDA-approved 
MMA would cost ten times the amount of creating one that did not need 
FDA approval.306  When faced with these potential delays and costs, many 
                                                          
 299.  See Jeffrey Shuren, Dir. of the CDRH, FDA, Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed 
Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 11 (May 13, 2014), 
available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf  (“[W]e deal with product that doesn’t stand in isolation, but is part of a system, and really 
systems within systems.”). 
 300.  See Noveck, supra note 297, at 551 (discussing how the FDA’s reliance on external 
expertise contributes to slower review of medical devices). 
 301.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“A dedicated center would also help to build 
regulatory capacity for a future that will be much more digitized than it is even now.”). 
 302.  See Preventing Regulatory Overreach to Enhance Care Technology Act of 2014, S. 2007, 
113th Cong. § 2 (2014) (“Clinical and health software innovation cycles evolve and move faster 
than the existing regulatory approval processes.”). 
 303.  See, e.g., Fischer & King, supra note 10 (“The FDA’s work is important, but its 
processes are often painstakingly slow and based on outdated assumptions.  This halting 
regulatory pace, along with a lack of bureaucratic incentives to embrace disruptive technological 
change, has often held back progress.”); Franzen, supra note 7 (asking whether the FDA can 
regulate “phony medical apps without killing innovation”). 
 304.  FELLAY, supra note 5, at 7–8 (“With 20,000 applications being added to the Apple Store 
each month, competition for consumers’ attention and for their wallets is fierce.  Application 
developers need to engage in marketing efforts and receive consumer feedback to promote their 
products, but they cannot do so until they have received FDA clearance.”). 
 305.  Id.  It took the FDA four years to clear MIMvista, a diagnostic imaging app.  Id. at 8.  
 306.  Lauren Silverman, Your Smartphone Will See You Now: The Wild West of Medical Apps, 
KERA BREAKTHROUGHS (Aug. 12, 2014), http://breakthroughs.kera.org/the-smartphone-will-see-
you-now-medical-apps-have-lawyers-doctors-worried/.   
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app developers prefer to release their apps elsewhere, such as Europe or 
South Korea, where the regulatory schemes are more favorable.307  Without 
maximizing speed and efficiency in its regulatory approach, the FDA risks 
diverting promising and beneficial apps from the American public.308 
The FDA acknowledges this problem, and in an interview, Bakul 
Patel, a Senior Policy Advisor within the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health, stated that the MMA Guidance actually “scale[d] 
back” the FDA’s regulatory reach to make more room for innovation.309  A 
streamlined office staffed with both medical and technical experts should be 
able to make the premarket approval process more efficient.310  
Additionally, the personnel with mobile app backgrounds should be able to 
better understand the goals and motivations of other mobile health app 
manufacturers and developers, creating a more harmonious regulatory 
environment.311  While some delay is inevitable, ultimately, an Office of 
mHealth dedicated to facilitating FDA oversight of MMAs will likely 
encourage, not stifle, innovation.312 
c.  Lack of Enforcement Power 
Lastly, the Office of mHealth would need to be vested with authority 
to enforce and implement its policies and regulations in order to overcome 
the failings identified both in the dietary supplement context and the 
regulatory world at large.313  Several stakeholders have questioned how the 
                                                          
 307.  See FELLAY, supra note 5, at 7 (noting that large companies such as Samsung often 
introduce their mobile health products abroad well before breaking into the United States market).  
Some app developers will simply change the intended use of their product and “experiment[] with 
less-regulated markets,” such as veterinary science, to escape the FDA regulations.  Id.  
 308.  See Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 
CORNELL L. REV. 397, 417 (2007) (“In some settings, a particular regulatory beneficiary’s loss of 
expected benefits may not be as serious as the loss suffered by a regulated entity possibly facing 
fines or stringent permit requirements.  In other settings, however, such as those involving health, 
beneficiary losses might be the significant ones.”). 
 309.  Greg Slabodkin, FDA’s Bakul Patel: For Mobile Medical Apps, Patient Safety First, 
FIERCEMOBILE HEALTHCARE (May 23, 2013), 
http://www.fiercemobilehealthcare.com/story/fdas-bakul-patel-mobile-medical-apps-patient-
safety-first/2013-05-23. 
 310.  Cf. Noveck, supra note 297, at 567 (concluding that by bringing in the right kinds of 
experts, the FDA will be able to make quicker and better decisions).  
 311.  Cf. Cortez, supra note 43, at 1206.  Cortez commented on the lack of FDA expertise in 
mobile technology and the app developers’ ignorance of federal regulations exhibited in an FDA-
hosted public workshop.  Id.  A good way to remedy this disconnect, then, would be with 
individuals who understand both the world of mobile technology and the world of the FDA and 
administrative law.   
 312.  See Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“Congress must recognize that robust FDA 
oversight is not necessarily incompatible with innovation in the mHealth industry.  In fact, the 
industry’s long-term potential may depend on it.”). 
 313.  See Cortez, supra note 43, at 1181 (explaining that “regulators will need to provide 
genuine oversight, not just cheerleading” in order to fulfill their mandate of promoting public 
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FDA intended to enforce regulation of MMAs and expressed concern that 
there seemed to be no overarching accountability for bad actors.314  Even 
though stakeholders seem open to different methods of enforcement, 
potential tort or contract liability is not enough to keep companies 
accountable.315 
As a sub-agency, rather than a federal advisory committee, the Office 
of mHealth could be given authority to set and enforce clear regulatory 
standards while mobile health apps are still in the developing stages.316  The 
FDA should not have to wait for an outside party to discover wrongdoing in 
the mHealth sector; instead, the Office of mHealth should be able to 
identify bad actors and bring precedent-setting enforcement actions.317  
There may be more than one effective enforcement method: stakeholders 
have suggested alternatives to fines or recalls, including an official agency 
list of compliant companies made available to consumers, a promise of a 
faster registration process for meeting the suggested standards, or simply 
public shaming of bad actors with inferior products.318  As one stakeholder 
has aptly noted, however, “shame or praise may be incentive enough to 
bring in the developer community, but it also may not be.  In the meantime, 
while it is not happening, patients are at risk.”319  Therefore, it is essential 
                                                          
safety).  Perceived impotency is not a problem unique to the FDA.  Cf. Maass, supra note 278, at 
5 (“The FTC doesn’t strike fear into the heart of tech companies. . . . They know that as long as 
they stay within lax boundaries, it’s unlikely the FTC will bring enforcement actions against 
them.”). 
 314.  See, e.g., Meg Marshall, Cerner Corp., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-
Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 59 (May 13, 2014), available 
at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (asking “[W]ho is going to be the accountable oversight” “when an event happens” and 
explaining “there needs to be some sort of an enforcement mechanism”). 
 315.  See id. (“And whether it is a safety center with teeth or whether it is a nod to the 
regulatory, there needs to be something, some sort of a recourse other than a provider or a 
consumer’s private rights of action through contract or tort law.”).  It is likely that many start up 
app developers would not have the funds to make pursuing certain tort or contract suits 
worthwhile.  
 316.  See id. at 9 (advocating that the FDA needs to quickly develop an enforcement method to 
apply in the HIT sector, and ultimately, “[t]he results must be more than words on paper”). 
 317.  See supra notes 281–282 and accompanying text (discussing the M.T.U.’s method of 
enforcing privacy standards in the app world); see also Cortez et al., supra note 5, at 377 (“As 
experience with the dietary-supplement market has shown, manufacturers will have few incentives 
to comply with FDA requirements that lack enforcement teeth.”).  
 318.  See Joel White, Executive Dir., Health IT Now Coalition, Remarks at Public Workshop: 
Proposed Risk-Based Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 92–93 (May 
13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf (suggesting positive and negative incentives for industry accountability and enforcement). 
 319.  Robert Jarrin, Qualcomm, Inc., Remarks at Public Workshop: Proposed Risk-Based 
Framework and Strategy for Health Information Technology 99 (May 13, 2014), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/NewsEvents/WorkshopsConferences/UCM40550
9.pdf.  
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that the FDA’s regulatory scheme for MMAs include ways to ensure 
compliance, and the Office of mHealth would be uniquely situated to 
determine the best methods for such a regime. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
The question of how the FDA should regulate mobile health apps 
without sacrificing innovation or public safety is an important one currently 
being considered by federal agencies, stakeholders, and Congress.320  
Although some industry lobbyists want Congress to use legislation to limit 
the FDA’s authority over mobile health apps, this type of statutory 
preemption is premature because the industry is still evolving and the FDA 
needs flexibility to be able to respond adequately to new risks to patients 
and consumers.321  When Congress limited FDA authority over dietary 
supplements, another consumer-oriented industry, with the enactment of the 
Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act of 1994, the result was 
increased risk to consumers and an agency that was unable to effectively 
respond.322  Because of the similarities between mobile health apps and 
dietary supplements, DSHEA offers an important model of what can 
happen if Congress again uses a statute to interfere with agency 
discretion.323  Instead of taking regulatory jurisdiction from the FDA, 
Congress should form a mobile health focused sub-agency, the Office of 
mHealth, within the FDA.324  This is a better approach because such an 
office would equip the FDA with the expertise and tools necessary to 
overcome regulatory barriers and to be an effective and efficient mobile 
medical app regulator.325 
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